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掲載誌: Interdisciplinary Information Sciences

巻: 15

号: 2

ページ: 125-146

年: 2009-09-04

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10097/45575
Spheres of Governance in the Global Linkage: Collapse of American Ambition and Transnational Advocacy Coalition Networks

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Received June 8, 2009; final version accepted June 26, 2009

Globalization prompts governance activities to become more transnational and brought about the chain of reciprocal relations between multiple actors. Global governance is defined as the whole processes of making rules and norms and implementing governance activities to facilitate the coordination and interdependency of collective actions of multiple actors at the global, transnational regional, national, domestic regional, local levels. While there is no single polity like a world government, global governance does neither belong to a single hegemonic nation state, nor a single institution with a regulatory authority. As global governance activities are not limited to the activities of nation states, but should be carried by the activities of nonstate actors, they would be achieved through partnerships and participatory ways of multi-level actors by multiple linkages.

Though globalization brings about two dimensional dynamics of convergence and divergence, the latter typical example was the 9/11 terrorist attacks. While we were faced with the dysfunction of the existing rules and norms, we were obliged to reconsider how to deconstruct the structure and architecture of global political framework. Over this point, we will consider the present situation of global political governance after American ambition to become a single hegemonic state was collapsed at that point of 9/11 and America had to change its unilateralism to multilateralism to carry the two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. And next, we will scrutinize what kind of theoretical framework can explain both global governance and global activities. We will introduce theories of hyper state centrism and hyper globalism and propose to make up the transnational advocacy coalition networks by the global linkages among positive actors.

KEYWORDS: Pseudo Empire, 9/11 Terrorist Attacks, Governance Activities, Global Linkage, Transnational Advocacy Coalition Networks

1. Introduction: Agenda Setting Behind Globalization

Globalization is actually seen everywhere in our globe. Globalization has a diversity of constellations of complicated politics, floundering economics, more endangered military affairs, multilayered cultures, conflicting religions, rapidly increasing populations, alternative energy resources, serious environmental pollution and severe human rights cross the world. These are of course deeply linked each other, and one leads to another. Globalization is therefore based on the interdependency that any nation state and any government cannot act without having reciprocal relations with other nation states and other governments.

For this reason, globalization has presented and continues to present us with many challenges, some of which would be positive and some of which would be negative. Though it goes without saying that globalization has not resulted in a global political identity that fosters global solidarity, it prompts governance activities to become more supranational, political problems to become more transnational, and political legitimization to be all the more affected by transnational processes and transnational rules and norms. Above all, governance activities in politics and economics are strongly interconnected more than ever and they have solid mutual relations like a woven cobweb. Since globalization consists of the chain of reciprocal relations between multiple actors, governance activities at the global level have to make and maintain in some way the architecture of coordination and interdependency between them.

It is sure that governance activities at the global level must be closely analyzed in consideration for their manifold forms in which governance is exercised by multiple actors and by the competition and cooperation between governance providers. Being attendant on globalization, there are a number of problems of governance activities which lie outside the sovereign jurisdiction of nation states and go beyond the scope of existing nation states. At the global level, there are various governance activities conducted by many institutions and organizations that can operate being independent from nation states. However, while nation states retain the major resources needed for effective global governance, considerable parts of institutions and organizations are still largely dependent on nation states which initiate and support them.

At any rate, globalization poses very distinct challenges to nation states, but that only way to respond these challenges is to rely upon the mechanisms of coordination and interdependency not only between them but also beyond
them. While transnational consortia of global governance exist which are made up of inter-governmental regimes and inter-national agencies like the United Nations, IMF, WTO, and so on, there are other transnational groupings composed of transnational corporations (TNCs) and non governmental organizations (NGOs) or not-for-profit organizations (NPOs) which want to frame a kind of transnational advocacy coalition networks.

In this sense, global governance is to be defined as all processes of collective activities to make decisions, rules and norms, and their implementation by multiple actors and organizations. In other words, it would be understood as the whole processes of implementing governance activities and making rules and norms which facilitate the coordination and interdependency of collective actions between multiple actors at the global level (macro), the transnational regional level, the national level (meso), the domestic regional level and the local level (micro). That is why the government of nation states would not be an indispensable condition of governance activities at the global level, while a political entity of the government is the necessary architecture within every sovereign nation state. Because the political entity of every nation state is able to delegate a lot of its governance activities to transnational bodies and transnational consortia leading global governance.

It is needless to say the dynamics of globalization of course have to be regulated and governance activities at the global level have to maintain global order according to all kinds of rules and norms. The increasing depth and complexity of globalization has given rise to what kind of formal characteristics global governance would be able to take. What the most problematic here is consequently what kind of subjects would be able to take the initiative and make such rules and norms, and who would be able to wield the decision making power to bring about global order. Because global governance does neither belong to a single powerful nation state as the hegemonic state of an empire, nor to a single institution with a recognized regulatory authority and mandate. Hence, global governance would be able to have a reality not in a single institution but in global linkages that are able to bring together a diversity of actors and organizations. We have to grope the possibility that governance activities are carried out not by a top-down hierarchical institution, whether at the global level or at the national level, but by global multiple linkages between different institutions, organizations and groups which are able to share values and responsibilities with each other.

Accordingly, on the one hand, since there is no single institution and no single body like a world government which can function well as similar to the central government of a nation state, global governance has to do with the ways of governing which are quite different from the domestic system in a nation state. Governance activities at the global level must achieve this governing through partnerships and participatory ways by multiple linkages. As a matter of fact, we have at present only transnational consortia composed of transnational organizations including nation states. Such transnational consortia have been acting and continue to act for a kind of functions of nation states at the global level. This is so far the actual situation of global governance activities. However, the broader the participation of stakeholders composed of transnational consortia, transnational institutions, nation states, TNCs, NGOs and NPOs, the more important it is for every stakeholder to take responsibilities for decision making and implementation of global public policies as well as global rules and norms.

On the other hand, TNCs, in place of nation states, have not yet made their own alliance all over the world and have not yet implemented to decide, for example, how they can provide globally standardized products in everywhere along with globally standardized rules and norms. With much regret, these rules and norms have been usually made by transnational consortia like WTO mainly composed of representatives delegated from nation states. In parallel with TNCs, NGOs and NPOs, in place of nation states, have not yet carried out their roles to make decisions on foreign aid programs (ODA) and implement their supporting programs by themselves. To be regrettable, up to now, these rules and norms have been almost always made by transnational consortia like the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and so on.

In sum, on the one hand, governance activities at the global level have brought about the problem of convergent global order based on governance activities of multiple actors. Such a framework of convergence has been already brought about and global order has been partially established as transnational consortia. However, on the other hand, there is a contradictory deviation from the existing order, which is brought about by actors discontented with the present situation. Such discontented governance activities continue to be unfinished global governance. As everybody knows, such a deviation was inadvertently exposed by the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

In this paper, we would like to consider the present situation of political governance after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which has been reigned by the United States as the unilateral hegemonic state since the early 1990s to the early 2000s. Such an ambitious strategy of the United States was however collapsed at that point of 9/11 in 2001, and was forced to change its insolent unilateralism to its reluctant attitude of multitilateralism in compromise and coordination with other nation states. As for an imperative to show the presence of global governance, firstly, we would like to examine though the United States has ambitious to become a single hegemonic state as an empire, such an ambition was however only a fancy of “pseudo empire” by an overview of synchronic processes of the Afghanistan War and the Iraqi War.

We will scrutinize, secondly, what kind of framework is possible to explain global governance and governance activities from now on. We would like to examine the mutual relations between multiple actors as stakeholders of global governance composed of transnational consortia, transnational institutions, nation states, TNCs, NGOs and NPOs. As clues to search, we will analyze some factors of governance such as characters of actors, actors as veto
players and advocators, ways of bargaining between actors, actors of advocacy coalitions, making of consortia by the linkage between multilayered actors.

2. Presence of Global Governance: From Unilateralism to Multilateralism

2.1 Collapse of Pseudo Empire and the War against Terrorism

In our last thesis, we emphasized that unilateral ruling by the hegemonic state of America as a “pseudo empire” since the collapse of the cold war system in 1989 was over by the outbreak of 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and by the beginning of the war fighting with terrorism (Yamamoto, 2008). The raison d’être of American unilateralism was lost and the United States had to quit and change its hegemonic coercive attitude as if it were a ruler of the empire. Its principal reason is that the former Bush administration was forced to call for volunteers to fight against terrorism and to rebuild an alliance with other major powers which were expected to be in partnership with America in going to war just after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Immanuel Wallerstein, the first eminent advocate of world system theory and a senior research scholar at Yale University, narrates us, “An America that continues to relate to the world by a unilateral assertion that it represents civilization, whether it does so in the form of isolationist withdrawal or of active interventionism, cannot live itself. What we do to the world, we do to ourselves” (Wallerstein, 2003: 215). As he lays emphasis on it, what American unilateralism did arrogantly to the world did in turn retaliate upon American unilateralism itself.

However, it was unfortunate for the former President George Bush that the war with terrorism is quite different from the conventional war with a nation state. As terrorists are elusive and appear in unforeseen places and at unexpected time, and they turn up and go away everywhere and every time, any American ground forces equipped by advanced technologies cannot find out exactly where terrorist bases exist and cannot make easily a vigorous attack against the core body of terrorist forces. Almost every battlefront is around the residence in cities, towns and villages, and American ground forces on the spot cannot distinguish horrible terrorists from innocent citizens, because terrorists at any time try to do their suicide bombing attacks by mingling with the bustling crowd of such innocent people.

Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International, denounces terrorists affiliated with an Islamic extremist faction, “[It] would also describe them as they often really are: small local gangs of misfits hoping to attract attention through nihilism and barbarism” (Zakaria, 2008:12). In spite of his malicious criticism, the actual situation is quite different from his point of view. Terrorism like Taliban/Al Qaeda coalitions, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza district of Palestine are not local gangs with nihilism and barbarism, but they have own troops and have been effectively controlling their own territories for a certain period of time.

Thereby, the Bush administration was obliged to judge and denounce that the ringleader of the 9/11 terrorist attacks is an Islamic extreme fundamentalist Al Qaeda, and Taliban which is also an Islamic extreme fundamentalist in Afghanistan is certainly the terrorist’s backbone patron and protector and has been supporting Al Qaeda up to now. In his formal proclamation, Bush denounced by name that dominant forces of terrorism consist of Al Qaeda leaded and sponsored by Osama bin Laden, who was in connection not only with the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Virginia, but also with the bombing attacks of the United States embassies in Dar es Salaam of Tanzania and in Nairobi of Kenya on August 7, 1998. In addition, Bush asserted that terrorists have been strongly supported by the Taliban regime of Afghanistan. As there was some kind of reliable information that Al Qaeda has been hiding in Afghanistan, Taliban and Al Qaeda must have joined hands solidly each other. Based on such dubious and insufficient evidences, Bush decided to begin his holy war for justice, i.e. his own Jihad, and to attack against terrorists and against Afghanistan.

In the presence of the war with terrorism, Bush’s America had to abandon its strategy of unilateralism and change into the framework of multilateralism to make a friendly relationship with other major powers, which are expected to dispatch troops and share war expenditures along with its demand or at its command. As its backdrop for the only resort, there were two resolutions 1267 and 1333 by the UN Security Council directed to the Taliban regime, which applied sanctions to turn over bin Laden for trial in the bombing attacks in Africa in August 1998. When the military operations for “Endeavoring Freedom” were launched by the United States and its closest ally, Great Britain on October 7, 2001, the UNSC did not authorize a series of American military campaign.

After debating for some time as to whether American military invasion to Afghanistan is legitimate or not to an act of collective security under the UN Charter, Article 51, the UNSC authorized at last to set up the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) which can take all measures for fulfilling the interim mandate to maintain security in Afghanistan in December 2001. Since August 2003 up to now, ISAF command has been delegated to NATO. Along with the coalition forces of the United States and Great Britain, troops for security assistance of Canada, Germany, France and other forty countries were sent to the Afghan battlefield.

One year and a half later after the beginning of the war in Afghanistan, the Bush administration decided to dispatch troops to Iraq. According to Martin Shaw, British scholar of international relations (IR) at the University of Sussex, in the sense that Bush attacked Iraq as likely to threaten in the near future since he wanted to stall an immanent war and to prevent a threat from emerging, American invasion was preemptive. What’s more, in the sense that Bush wanted to
overthrow a governmental system considered dangerous to its own people as well as to the world, a series of measures taken by Bush is to justify the war only by the regime change (Shaw, 2005: 99, 157). In short, the Bush administration decided to begin the preventive war to bring about and promote the regime change of Iraq. And thus, in March 2003, American military campaign began with being authorized under the UNSC resolution 1441, which was adopted by the unanimous consent that Iraq should abandon all preserved weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and should accept the inspections of weapons and facilities including the executive office of Saddam Hussein by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).

In the war in Iraq, the situation was quite different from the war in Afghanistan, and almost all core troops were from the United States and Great Britain, because France and Germany rejected to attend the coalition forces to attack against Iraq. Just as worried about it in advance, American ground forces on the spot could not find out any evidence that Saddam Hussein had made a secret agreement with Al Qaeda leaded by Osama bin Laden and had supported to give weapons to terrorists. Indeed, there was no evidence that Iraq had preserved and was preserving WMD in large quantities, which the Bush administration used a plausible excuse to begin the war against Saddam Hussein. Hence, Wallerstein denounces again the American military campaign as invalid, “[W]e should start by realizing that, from a military point of view, 9/11 should never have happened. One year later, the perpetrators have not been caught. And our major military response has been to invade Iraq, a country that had nothing to do with the September 11 attack” (Wallerstein, 2003: 3).

Moreover, Peter Katzenstein, a representative constructivist scholar of world politics at Cornell University, brings into relief that the Iraqi War was begun with faulty and fabricated intelligence, without an immediate threat and without genuine support of other countries. “Unilateralism and preemptive war, always latent in the repertoire of U. S. foreign policy, have been declared the country’s national security doctrine. The war to remove Saddam Hussein from power in 2003 was planned and initiated without a compelling, immediate threat and without genuine and widespread international support. The Bush administration relied on faulty and possibly fabricated intelligence to convince Congress and the American people, though not many of its allies, to go to war” (Katzenstein, 2005: 242).

Even a hawkish liberalist of IR like Anne-Marie Slaughter at Princeton University makes an emphasis on that the end based on the false warrant cannot justify the means. “The nations that insisted on more evidence that Iraq actually possessed weapons of mass destruction, more time for the inspectors to do their work, more time for a fully mobilized international community to exert diplomatic pressure, proved to be right. I believe that the Iraqi people for creating a stable and more democratic Iraqi government are still alive, although they are going to require coordinated international effort and assistance for many years. But the end cannot justify the means with regard to war. Any more than we can authorize police to detain and search ordinary citizens on a false warrant as long as they ultimately find some evidence of criminal activity. The United States offered the world a false warrant” (Slaughter, 2006: 110).

Though the call for bringing the end of dictatorship by Saddam Hussein and for eliminating Islamic extremist terrorists was based on such a false warrant, American armed forces invaded Iraq and occupied Baghdad by the blitz operations just in three weeks. The Iraqi War, so called the Second Gulf War, was quite different from the First Gulf War since 2001 to 2002. In the latter case, the cause of which was Saddam Hussein wanted to gain concession of oil, invaded Kuwait forcibly and was met with a strong opposition not only by the United States and European countries but also by other Arab countries, the then President Bush Sr., could not overwhelm the despotism of Saddam Hussein since he hesitated to march his troops to Bagdad.

To the contrary, in the case of Second Gulf War, while Baghdad was occupied and Iraqi troops were destroyed in only a month, Australia, Japan and other more than 50 countries proposed to participate in the coalition forces to fight against Saddam Hussein and his troops and to maintain security and contribute to humanitarian aids in Iraq. After the coalition forces put under the control all over Iraq, captured Saddam Hussein and put him in jail, the interim government was made by the hurried election in January 2005, and for the time being the Nouri al-Maliki regime launched out upon a rebuilding of the Iraqi government in May 2006. As is known well, bin Laden and his Al Qaeda were supported and brought along by the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to stand up to and fight against the dispatched Soviet army and its puppet communist government of Afghanistan since the late 1970s. They were given a large amount of money, supplied massive weapons, sent as the volunteer corps to the Afghan battlefield and fought against the communist forces in cooperation with a variety of anti-communist militia forces of mosaic ethnic groups such as the Northern Alliance and the like. Talibam was from the outset one of the militant groups organized among students in Sunnis divinity schools which aim to train theologians learning the Islamic doctrine. Therefore, Talibam was one of the various anti-communist forces, which was of course supported by CIA.

Meanwhile, Talibam has gradually got the primary military and political position while other ethnic militia groups, which were of course supported by CIA, have been repeatedly continuing atritional conflicts between them each other. At last, Talibam won the struggle for hegemony and built its legal government in Afghanistan. At the end of war with the Soviet army and its puppet communist forces, while Talibam speculated to build an ideal Islamic fundamentalist state, the United States speculated to transplant an ideal American democratic state and governance into Afghanistan. As a consequence, both camps clashed violently each other, and such a cleavage of identity politics between Talibam and the United States led them to the decisive crossroad.
This crossroad was quite difficult for the United States to choose, because both parties concerned could not accept ideas of their opposite side each other, and any alternative of effective measures did not occur to them. If Islamic fundamentalist forces win the victory in Afghanistan, Sunnis forces superior in Afghanistan would collide and fight with Shiahs forces of Iran. At present, such a war between two factions of Islamic fundamentalism sounds like only an incoherent fiction, but we should prepare the worst scenario and try to get the risky situation under control. If the clash and war between Sunnis and Shiahs occurs cross the border between Afghanistan and Iran, it might be tentatively convenient to the conventional global policy of the United States that an enemy of the existing enemy is a friend for the moment.

As for its adocracy, the United States would be for the time being able to make use of Afghanistan in counter with Iran. But such a situation would bring a new burden for the United States at first to prevent and next to intervene in the conflict and war between two Islamic factions and try to bring peace on the surface again to this area. Even if such an attempt results in only a temporary peace, American efforts would be in its own way praised all over the world. Such an ambivalent attitude has been consistently common feelings of successive American presidents and their administrations as the leading power of Pax Americana during the postwar period.

At the same time, such a clash of identity politics might bring about not only the military imbalance, but also the geopolitical imbalance between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Actually, the North-Western Frontier Province is called tribal areas, officially Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), including Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Kurram and North/South Waziristan and so on, and is under the effective control of Neo Taliban forces. Neo Taliban forces are now coming up close to the Capital Islamabad, and President Asif Zardari leading the Pakistani People’s Party is forced to show the ambivalent attitude which has repeated many times to bomb some occupied areas by Neo Taliban and to compromise with it to cease temporarily conflicts between them. Incidentally, we have to add here that Benazir Bhutto, who was his wife and the assassinated former Prime Minister, made a fatal mistake during her rule to support the Taliban forces which gained prominence and took power in Kabul in September 1996, and even sent a small unit of the Pakistan army into Afghanistan to support the Taliban forces. Afterwards, she changed her stance into being anti-Taliban and began to condemn its terrorist acts.

Thus, the battlefield between American troops and Talibin forces has spread over the border, and American troops have been continuing to attack Taliban bases cross the border though the Zardari regime does not want to accept American attack cross the border. If the worst case would happen that Pakistan comes to be ruled effectively by Sunnis fundamentalists, domestic conflicts throughout the whole of Pakistan might certainly leap over the border of India. If Pakistan domestic conflicts leap cross the border, the geopolitical fragile balance between Pakistan and India would necessarily become much more dangerous than ever and would come to a deadlock in addition to the Kashmir dispute over their boundary between both countries. If such a very risky situation becomes a reality, another party concerned, China, would lean out to lay the trap of shark repellent on the pending matter over the border and on the military and political power balance. We have to concern about the worst scenario over the long term dispute between three parties concerned.

What’s more, as is known widely, Pakistan and India have already preserved nuclear weapons and are now going on the fierce close contest to develop nuclear weapons and nuclear missiles. However, since both countries have not yet concluded the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT: 1970) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT: 1996), we cannot put a hoop on both sides to control themselves to prevent surely the use of nuclear weapons and to escape the nuclear annihilation. Incidentally, not only Pakistan and India, but also the United States, China and Israel have not yet ratified CTBT. It is quite dangerous that not only Pakistan and India but also other countries are out of the framework of CTBT as the public sphere of global nuclear governance.

Focusing on the domestic power balance in Pakistan, even if Neo Talibin gains ascendancy over fairly parts including Islamabad, it is probable that nuclear bombs would be fallen into the hands of Neo Talibin. We are now worrying if such a dangerous situation might occur. In addition, focusing on the geopolitical relation between Pakistan and India, if Neo Talibin forces win the victory and rule as the legitimised regime over a fairly broad part of Pakistan, we cannot but assume even a possibility that the situation would occur to threaten the opponent by expressing to use nuclear weapons each other. This is also the worst scenario, but we have to suppose that even the worst case would happen and to prepare for maintaining the public goods of nuclear disarmament in the public sphere of global governance. Though President Barack Obama declared that nuclear weapons should be abolished completely in his address in Prague on April 5, 2009, his idealistic doctrine would not be so easy to come to a reality. Because the United States would not make the consensus between nuclear states while it has not yet become a member of CTBT.

Accordingly, as far as it acknowledges itself to be the police of the world, the United States has for the time being to play a difficult and severe role to suppress Islamic extreme fundamentalists, to build a moderate government and to make up the stable state and society in Afghanistan. By bringing about a stable situation in Afghanistan, the United States would be able to make Afghanistan a buffer zone to neighboring countries and drive in a wedge in the Central Asia. When such a stable situation is realized, the United States would be able to conciliate and get Islamic members in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) of Russia on its side.

As is shown in the military exercises in Georgia in collaboration with NATO military forces in May 2009, the United States wants to drive in a wedge in Russia. In turn, while Georgia is not a member of CIS, Russia wants to detaine
Georgia under its influence and maintain its powerful framework to influence upon the Central Asia. And thus, when the war in Afghanistan has been much more thrown into an infinite chaos, we may keep the worst scenario in our mind. In sum, on the contrary to American expectation, the Afghan situation would reach a deadlock and American troops would not be able to withdraw completely from Afghanistan in five years or so and even in ten years. It was the fate of the former President Bush and it would be the fate of present President Obama, too.

By the way, Saddam Hussein was also backed up and given a large quantity of weapons by the United States to fight against Iran since 1984 to 1988. The Iran-Iraqi War since 1980 to 1988 aimed not only to settle the problem of boundary and hunt for the concession of oil, but also to intervene in the Iran revolution led by Islamic religious top leader, the Reverend Khomeini, in 1979. After the Iran-Iraqi War was over, the United States ceased at once to provide weapons to Iraq to maintain the military balance in the Middle East. As Saddam Hussein was the brute dictator both in the Iraqi government and the Baath Arab Socialist Party and was a member of Sunnis which was the dominant Islamic faction in Iraq at that time, he began to massacre Shiahs being superior in number in the southern part and the Kurds being the minority in number in the northern part.

Concerning the case of the Iraqi War, we can say the same thing as the relation between the coalition forces of Taliban and Al Qaeda and American troops. For the decisive difference of identity politics between Saddam Hussein and the United States, both parties clashed in the crossroads as to whether Islamic religious ruler should be Shiahs or Sunnis in Iraq and in the Middle East. In addition, the United States wanted to maintain the military balance in the Middle East, as the protector of Israel. Israel has been consistently in antagonism with the Palestinian and their self-government, especially the Islamic fundamentalist Hamas which is the present actual ruler in the Gaza district, and has also been in antagonism with all Arabian countries, especially with Iran ruled by Shiahs. Another point at issue was utterly different, but quite important as to who should preserve the concession of oil. It was to gain the concession of oil that Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. This problem has been decisively influencing on the power balance all over the Middle East since the World War I, including old suzerain states before the World War II.

Nevertheless, the Iraqi War was not over in the short term being contrary to an optimistic expectation in advance in the Bush administration and among the American people. As wasteful time goes by, the unconventional war which has to battle with terrorists has been stuck in the mud. More than 4,300 soldiers of the American military forces were killed in the battle and a large number of soldiers were sacrificed by the suicide bombing attacks by terrorists since March 2003. American team of duty has caused a great deal of mental damage of returned soldiers and the rate of their mental disease and self-suicide has been rapidly increased. While the war was dragged on and came to a standstill, there is no probability to withdraw troops completely from Iraq in the short term in spite of the declaration of President Obama.

Now then, we do not want here to denounce Bush’s primitive feeling of vengeance for the sacrificed people by the 9/11 terrorist attacks to begin his war against terrorism and to pry into whether his war in Afghanistan and in Iraq was the holy war for justice or not. We would like to leave Michael Walzer, a representative communitarian scholar at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, to judge as to whether Bush’s war was a just one or not. Walzer wants to insist that Bush’s war in Afghanistan has its justice. In addition, he emphasizes that we should not think of the war as a police action aimed at bringing criminals to justice, but the lives of American people are visibly and certainly at risk and it is in fact the right thing to fight against terrorists and their patrons because the first obligation of the state is to protect the lives of its citizens (Walzer, 2004: 136–140). Though his point of view is too primitive and too naive, it reflects quite natural and exceedingly enthusiastic feelings of good American citizens at the beginning of military operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

2.2 Worldwide Financial Meltdown and the Change of Economic Power Relations

Notwithstanding such primitive feelings of the American people and Bush’s blazing anger as the President, American war expenditures both in Afghanistan and in Iraq have been in an instance going up rapidly. Unfortunately, while war expenditures had been increased enormously, the Bush administration failed to make urgent and effective treatments against the tremendous loss brought by the wildcat trading of financial derivatives among credit institutions including mortgage clams, i.e. subprime loans for low income housing. Bush’s decisive failure resulted in the ripple effect of credit crunch and the financial panic among credit institutions since the middle summer 2007. Meanwhile, American twin deficits, both the trade deficit (the current account deficit) and the budgetary deficit, were swelled rapidly by the trigger of “Black September” 2008.

As a result, the economic condition fell into the worst pass and brought about not only the financial crisis in the economic circles, but also the economic crisis of the state, which was the same condition as Reaganomics troubled by the twin deficits during the first half of the 1980s. The American economic condition has indeed become worse than in the time of the Reagan administration. It is needless to say that American twin deficits, especially the trade deficit, were the major cause to have brought about the financial meltdown which simultaneously affected across the world. We are induced to recall the nightmare of the Great Depression known as “Black Tuesday” on October 29, 1929 under the Herbert Hoover administration. According to the nomenclature of Susan Strange, the late British scholar of international studies at University of Warwick, the financial meltdown this time told us that American “Casino Capitalism” was at last collapsed (Strange, 1983).
To keep step with the vicious spiral of decreasing in domestic demand and employment, the Bush administration was required to propose drastic measures to revitalize the economic condition before running into a grave situation. If the Bush administration and the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) decided to inject public funds at least in the early summer 2008, such a fatal blow by the wrong disposal of subprime loan credit would have been escaped before financial institutions, e.g., Lehman Brothers, were collapsed.

However, FRB could not present any effective financial policy and unfortunately did not want to admit the plan of Lehman Brothers to shift to an independent holding company of banks and rejected to inject public funds, so that Lehman Brothers went into bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. Merrill Lynch was also resigned to its fate to be merged with Bank of America on January 1, 2009. In turn, faced with an unprecedented situation of emergency, FRB decided to implement an utterly contrary policy to accept almost similar plans of Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs. The Bush administration and FRB were completely confused and made a fatal mistake to adopt such a contradictory financial policy and did not take immediately any other effective urgent measures to meet the worst situation.

An unprecedented financial crisis for Bush and his administration gave serious influence on the real economy with the credit contraction and brought about a trilogy of anxieties, i.e. finance, housing and employment. The worst cause of these failures was to buy and sell derivatives on credit again and again through a number of agents. Such an incoherent credit transaction based on the way of financial engineering gave serious influence on the credit of consumer loans. Such a miserable condition of the real economy compelled to decrease abruptly not only individual consuming but also prices of housing. Those low income people who were in debt to a great sum of housing loans went into bankruptcy and quite a number of people were driven into being homeless.

Though it is the fact the Bush administration tried to take some countermeasures to cope with exigency, almost all of them were in vain. Though it is the fact that FRB lowered the real interest rate to almost zero as one of the urgent measures, this prescription was also in vain. A series of countermeasures did not have any immediate effect on the recovery of the worst economic condition. As a result, American financial panic has penetrated in an instance into the whole world. Due to the irreparable policy failure to cope with and alleviate the financial meltdown, both the great depression and the financial panic penetrated simultaneously into the whole world.

Under the present circumstances of the simultaneous great depression and financial panic cross the world, not only the United States but also the EU countries, Japan and China cannot expect a dramatic recovery of foreign demands. As typical in Japan, it has been consistently continuing the foreign demand-led economic growth and depending on foreign demands and triggered by them, and its real economy was declined in the short term and there was the rapid decrease in its GDP over −12.6% for only half a year. Let us remember the economic situation in the early 1970s, stagflation occurred and simultaneously brought about both depression not only in financial circles but also in industrial circles and rapid increasing of prices of all commodities.

However, the present economic situation is quite different from stagflation in the first half of the 1970s. There was an anxiety that depression might bring about deflation together with it, and such a situation has already been realized which gives rise to stagnation being simultaneous with deflation. By increasing a reflationary budget, even by any counter cyclical policy, a business upturn would not be accelerated at one push and we would not be able to expect a rapid bottoming out of the worst economic situation everywhere cross the world in the short term. Accordingly, we have to make up our mind it is inevitable all over the world that we would experience again “Japanese Blank for 10 Years” cross the millennium since the early 1990s to the first half of the 2000s.

President Obama pronounced to invest public funds to housing primarily, to establish a bad bank which aims to buy bad assets, and by such a package of emergent economic measures to put the brakes on credit contractions. In parallel with it, he declared to implement the “Green New Deal” policy as long range economic measures to bring about increasing employment by investing the public funds on the large scale to alternative energy industries like wind power generation, bio-fuel, solar cell and electric automobiles. With much regret, such measures would not take a remarkable effect at once.

On the one hand, the economic policy of the Obama administration, so called “Obamanomics,” would be compelled to carry out a large sum of public spending packages to stabilize the existing financial circumstances and to stimulate the real American economy as a whole. On the other hand, Obama has to enforce executive managers to take responsibility for their failure and to regulate the way of fund raising for speculative trading, for example, by increasing the credit line of borrowed capitals, so-called Leveraged Buyout (LBO), with putting up mortgage on real estates to increase the apparent sum of acquisition and capital gain to invest in a hostile takeover and so on.

It is nevertheless quite difficult for Obama to throw out his chest as to whether his measures would be possible or not to escape drastically from the worst economic crisis during the postwar period. Obama would for all that be obliged to inject public funds repeatedly many times into not only financial institutions like American International Group (AIG) and Citibank, but also private companies including the Big Three automobile industries. One of them is Chrysler which was on the verge of bankruptcy. After it filed for bankruptcy on the Article 11 of the Federal Bankruptcy Law, Chrysler was merged by the Italian automobile company Fiat. Another one is General Motors (GM), which has been driven to the brink of going into bankruptcy. It was decided while the European branch of GM, Opel, is merged by Canadian automobile parts maker, Magna International, the main body of GM becomes for a while a state owned company and after that is find out its partner of reconstruction. Japanese automobile companies of Toyota, Nissan and Honda were
also swallowed up by mountainous waves of the financial panic and have greatly decreased over 70% of their performances in the fiscal year 2008. Nobody knows “How long will it go?” since stock values have touched rock bottom and been sinking even further.

In addition to such treatments for bringing a domestic robust economic recovery, the Obama administration would not by all means escape from the framework of “New Washington Consensus” proposed by the Bush administration in the G20 Financial Summit in December 2008. On the one hand, the increase of members from eight to twenty means to have declared that financial multilateralism has been much more expanded. On the other hand, it means conversely that it would be very difficult to make any kind of definite and effective consensus between so many twenty members. In fact, in the G20 Financial Summit held in London in early April 2009, such an anxiety of bitter enemies in the same boat was fully exposed, and any other concrete consensus was not made except for injecting additional public funds of 5 trillion dollars in the total amount for the economic recovery between twenty member states.

In sum, the result of G20 Financial Summit in London highlighted firstly the United States declared to have been driven to the corner to abandon endeavoring after the best treatments for itself and the short term recovery from the economic panic which was brought about by its own serious policy failure. For the time being, the United States was driven to turn its efforts to reconstruct its domestic economics by implementing “Buy American,” so that it cannot afford to accept trading demands from foreign countries, especially from Japan, which of course include automobiles, except hybrid and electric cars, and all kinds of other commodities produced by local subsidiaries located in some states of the United States. Japanese trade with the United States would be necessarily decreased by a large margin, and Japan would be obliged to shift to increase overseas trades with Asian countries, especially with China and India. Though it has not yet developed its matured domestic market, India has already been developing its promising markets in some fields of information and communication technology (ICT), automobiles, steel, and so on.

Secondly, on this occasion, the joint proclamation admitted that only G8 major countries can no longer resolve the financial meltdown and maintain the existing framework of global economic order itself. As a consequence, the status of G8 countries would be decreased gradually in their decision making not only on financial problems, but also on political and military problems. In the not so distant future, it would inevitably become a reality that without other twelve members, G8 countries would not be able to decide any effective financial policy and maintain successfully the framework of global economic governance.

In consideration of all respects, while the economic power and status of the existing advanced countries like the United States, EU countries and Japan is now going on declining, the economic power and status of the rapidly developing countries like BRICs and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), especially China, would be increased relatively. That is why China is the country which has taken the role of the world factory both in the 1990s and the 2000s and has steadily sustained its economic development +7% and more over. Being premised on its impressive achievement of economic development in these twenty years, China would be able to expect still more increasing in its domestic demands. When we are faced with this fact, we have to be ready for the situation that GDP of Japan and China will be certainly reversed in a few years and China will become the second economic power in global economy. In parallel with it, the hegemony in the global structure would become multiple more and more than now, and by pervading of multilateralism, the hegemony would become gradually homogeneous and equal between G20 member states. It would be taken up for discussion that the hegemony would be owned jointly and commonly among them.

2.3 Obama’s Two Wars and the Overloaded Crossroad

Just after the Inauguration Day on January 20, 2009, President Obama also declared to withdraw American troops from Iraq within two years and instead to increase troops which will be dispatched to Afghanistan within a measurable timeframe. That is to say, Obama wants to take a new turn in the present critical deadlock in Afghanistan and intends that if Afghan home affairs are stabilized by increasing American troops and its allies, the reinforcement of ground forces on the spot would contribute to bring about the stabilization not only in the situation of military operations of American army and the coalition forces, but also in the political situation of the Hamid Karzai regime since December 2004 and in the social life of the Afghan people. However, with much regret, such an advantageous situation would not be realized for President Obama and his administration.

As is known well, the majority people in Afghanistan are the Pashtun people, almost all of whom are affiliated with Sunnis, and are living both in Afghanistan and Pakistan cross the border, especially in the North-Western frontier areas, including the refugees from Afghanistan living in Pakistan refugee camps. Obama’s war against terrorists, especially Taliban and Al Qaeda led by Islamic fundamentalists and Osama bin Laden would therefore be obliged to stride over the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The present situation of the battle line has already been stuck in the mud, and though Obama as the President promised to withdraw all of the American troops from Iraq, his administration would not succeed to haul out of the mess in the battle over the border by the reinforcement of its troops in the short term.

Meanwhile, as also mentioned above, we have an anxiety when American troops are withdrawn from Iraq, the civil war in Iraq would be brought out between the majority Shiias and the minority Sunnis, and the civil war by both factions would become intensified and would be continued in the long run. Then, it is sure that the majority Shiias supported by Iran and its Islamic fundamentalists would finally win the war and the broad territory which Shiias has its
strong influence over both Iran and Iraq might be born in the not so distant future. Bush has been consistently anxious about it and has all the while continued to deliberate as to whether the war against Iran would be possible or not while the Bush administration has been warning to Iran not to escalate the development of nuclear bombs and missiles any more. If Shiahs forces win the victory, the power map in the Middle East and even in the whole Islamic world would be redrawn.

If such a shift of power balance becomes a reality, Israel would be directly influenced by the transformation of its surroundings and would not be able to maintain its existing position and even its territory which have been constructed by implementing the settlements in the Palestinian residence. That is why Israel attacked urgently against the Gaza district just before the Inauguration Day of President Obama for three weeks. Israeli fierce attack and the victory of extreme right wing parties in the Israeli general election in February 2009 reflected its terrible anxiety and terror as to whether Israel would be crushed or could live on in the present situation surrounded by the mighty enemy of Shiahas forces after American armed forces are wholly withdrawn from Iraq. Therefore, though President Obama decided for himself and promised his good American people to withdraw entirely his military forces from Iraq, his administration would not be able to withdraw its troops from Iraq in the short term for two years or so.

The Obama administration has already begun to have negotiations with the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad conservative regime of Iran behind closed doors and to drive a wedge into the two problems. The first one is that Iran should contain itself to develop nuclear weapons more than the present stocks, and the second one is that Iran should not instigate Shiahas forces superior in number to plunge into the civil war with Sunnis forces inferior in number in Iraq. In consequence, it is not at all different from the former Bush administration that Obama wants to prevent the export of Iran revolution by Shiahas forces to Iraq. Obama’s policy is the same stance as Bush’s strong measures of containing Iran. Thus, the strained relation between the Obama administration and the Ahmadinejad regime has not at all been changed after the general election of Iran in June 2009. Provably, Ahmadinejad might gamble on the war with Sunnis forces in Iraq to take the liberal opposition’s eyes off the domestic antagonism brought about by his own unfair election.

If things go well, by escaping from the complete “Shiahnization” of the whole of Iraq, Obama would like to make Iraq the country based on the American style democracy and the buffer zone to maintain the power balance in the Middle East. Such a policy is also the same as the occupation policy that Bush had built the plan to transplant to Iraq as having succeeded under the occupation of American military government in Japan and West German just in the postwar period. To realize such a policy framework, on the one hand, Obama needs to persuade Israel by any cost to abandon to attack directly the facilities, in which nuclear weapons have been producing in Iran. On the other hand, Obama ought to accept the Israeli military operations to attack the Palestine territories both in the Gaza district and in the West Bank district of the Jordan River which are the Israeli enemy for the present. In this respect, the Palestine people and their self-government have been and are forced to be a kind of scapegoat in compensation for that the United States has constantly compelled Israel to abandon the direct attacks to other Arabian countries after the Middle East Wars repeated four times and the Lebanon War, and at present to abandon the direct attacks to Iran and its nuclear facilities.

Summarizing the defect of American unilateralism, Emmanuel Todd, French critic famous for the first author who predicted the collapse of the old Soviet Union, denounces, “After years of perceived as a problem solver, the United States itself has now become a problem for the rest of the world. After having been the guarantor of political freedom and economic order for half a century, the United States appears more and more to be contributing to international disorder by maintaining where it can [be] uncertainty and conflict” (Todd, 2002: 1). As a matter of fact, American strategy has been consistently based on a sort of wishful “adhocracy” that an enemy of the present enemy of America is an American friend for the moment and only the eminently ad hoc combination of tactics in a haphazard way. As Todd lays emphasis on it, such an indiscrimate strategy has made America to have contributed to global disorder that a condition of uncertainty and a situation of partial conflicts and local wars have occurred all the time somewhere in the world. Though it has desired to occupy the unilateral hegemonic position politically, militarily and culturally all over the world, the United States could not rule unilaterally over the whole world except for only ten years or so during the post cold war period.

As for the conclusion here, we would like to highlight only one thing that at the point of time of 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, unilateralism of the United States came to the end, and at that time the Bush administration was obliged to abandon its strategy of unilateralism and transform it into multilateralism to restructure the alliance with other major powers. About fifteen years ago, Robert Cox, Canadian scholar of political science at York University, proposed a general concept of multilateralism. He describes that multilateralism can be examined from two main standpoints, one of which is the institutionalization and regulation of established order and the other is the locus of interaction for the transformation of existing order. However, two aspects find their bases in different parts of it and pursue different tactics. Its comprehensive enquiry cannot afford to focus on the one to the determinant of the other and the question of transformation is the more compelling of the two (Cox, 1996: 496–497).

Cox’s definition of multilateralism is still convenient for us and applicable to the present situation. It is the fact that global order is not club goods, but it should be public goods both principally and substantially. As far as any hegemonic framework, whether Pax Americana or Pax Sovietica, wants to be public goods to maintain global order and implement global governance, it cannot necessarily help depending on the power balance in parallel with some groupings of other
major powers. After the cold war system based on the high cost arms race and a thin ice of power balance by the bipolar system between Pax Americana and Pax Sovietica was collapsed, the United States has yeaned to expedite the unilateral hegemonic institutionalization to screen applicants according to whether they are amicable or not for itself, and to make new norms to regulate them and penetrate new norms to them. While such a transformation of American strategy had a tremendous influence to abandon the conventional concept of multilateralism, the United States was compelled to be content with a “pseudo empire” and to institutionalize and regulate global order for itself for only ten years or so.

However, by the outbreak of 9/11 terrorist attacks, heterogeneous actors appeared on the stage by the name of terrorists who are exterior to the existing global order. Their multiple interactions by the name of terrorism declared that even if American “pseudo empire” is the established order, it is only club goods composed of American amicable states and its friendly actors. As a consequence, another locus of interactions for the transformation of the existing order was born and has begun to compel to transform and restructure the existing order. After American “pseudo empire” was collapsed by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, another transformation of the existing order was requested to be newly born by deconstructing the existing global order.

In this sense, this turning point means that we are forced to look over again what our global order should be and whether we should admit even vicious terrorists as one of the multiple actors or not in the structure of world system and global order. Trying to jump to the conclusion, even if they are not sincere and respectable, we have to admit terrorists as the opponents of negotiation and conciliation. That is why they should not be exogenous, but should be endogenous in our global order. In other words, even if it feels disgust against Iran and North Korea, the community of America and its allies are obliged to have negotiations patiently with such axes of evil.

In fact, either the former Bush administration or the present Obama administration did not and does not want to destroy the framework of six party talks for holding a patient discourse with North Korea, even though it has been forcing its unreasonable demands that if it wants to maintain the framework of six party talks, the United States has to take back the label of “axis of evil,” and if it wants to stop the development of nuclear armament of North Korea, the United States has to double the economic aid, and so on. We have to say the same thing with vicious terrorists just as Talibian, Hezbollah and Hamas who should not be exogenous, but endogenous in the structure of global order and the global public sphere.

At any rate, by seeing this turning point in the flash, we are compelled to extend the category of actors and redefine the public sphere of governance whether at the global level or at the national level. We are accordingly driven to think that terrorists should be included as a member of actors in the public sphere of global governance even if they are unwelcome spiteful guests who have deviated from it as a dark side of globalization and even if they have no intention to participate obediently in it and are continuing to neglect it. Consequently, we do not want only to exclude and wipe out terrorists by sheer force, but also we have to make efforts for including them in the convergent public sphere of global governance. At present, we wonder if such an inclusion of terrorists into the public sphere of global governance would be exceedingly difficult. However, we have no other option but to continue to persuade them and demonstrate that their behaviors are unjust and they have to change their mind to compromise with other member actors in the public sphere of global governance.

3. Advocacy Coalition Framework and the Global Linkage

3.1 Post Westphalia and Sovereignty

Even if some hegemonic state is by far stronger than other nation states, even such a stronger hegemonic state cannot continue to rule perfectly over all of other nation states for oneself and order them to obey to it only by its forces. In the long diachronic history, though the strongest hegemonic state like the Roman Empire was in existence, it could not preserve its excessively broadened territory and its hierarchical ruling system. Since rebellions, domestic conflicts and wars occurred again and again, the Roman Empire turned itself into the severe situation which was betrayed by its vassal states and invaded by antagonistic enemies like the Huns, the Goths and the Vandals which did not want to obey submissively. Therefore, it could not exist as the comprehensive unity of Christian Community and was divided into the Western Roman Empire and the Eastern Roman Empire (the Byzantine Empire of the Greeks). Ultimately, the Western Empire was divided into innumerable secular countries and the Eastern Empire was ruined by the conquest of the Ottoman Empire.

The Holy Roman Empire, though it wanted to purport to be the successor of the Western Roman Empire, was an aggregation consisted of a large number of secular states which had a nominal emperor on the throne, sometimes the Habsburg, under the name of the Papacy of Rome and the German Nation. This cosmetic empire took a role to promote the secularization and collapse of the Western Roman Empire by advancing that the status of emperor is not given by the mediation of the pope, but by the direct grace of God. It would be similar to Islamic extreme terrorists that not only their relief, but also their justice and their legitimacy are not given by the mediation of the existing Islamic establishment, but by the direct grace of their God Allah. Hence, they have been continuing to advocate their maxim of returning to the fundamentalism of Islamic doctrine, and to persist in fighting not only with American invading army, but also with the existing Islamic establishment.
As it is very clear in the context mentioned above, the Holy Roman Empire was after all only a “pseudo empire” and could not rebuild a solid unity as the empire. Though sanguinary struggles between Catholic and Protestant came to the end when the Peace of Westphalia was concluded in 1648, the power of Habsburg being superior in Europe till then was relatively decreased. It has continued to exist mainly under the Crown of the Habsburg until the invasion by Napoleon I in 1805. The Congress of Vienna in 1815, which aimed to rebuild the European order after the defeat of Napoleon’s ambition to unite the whole Europe for himself, could not make the firm and unshakable framework, and the German Federation was newly born in the backdrop of the balance of power between Catholic Austria and Protestant Prussia. As reflected in the expression, “Le congrès danse beaucoup, mais il ne marche pas” (the congress dances very well, but it does not march forwards), this conference resulted in a melting pot of powers between Austria, France, the Great Britain and Russia. All of them wanted to become a hegemon superior to others.

They were however thrown together by fate. Such an imbalance of them became the cause of the Revolution in 1848, and its aftermath brought about the Prussian-French War in 1870, realized the unity of imperial Germany and transformed France into the eternal republic. Such an unstable condition in the whole Europe led to the expansion of severe arms race and the ambition of redistributing colonials being advantageous each other. As a result, while European major powers were disrupted both into the Triple Alliance by Germany, Austria and Italy and into the Triple Entente by Great Britain, France and Russia, both parties competed for their hegemony and struggled for their supremacy each other. Their imperialism to divide colonials again triggered off the World War I, which was the first total war in the history of human beings and drove the whole Europe to ruin. One of endeavors to restore from the ruined Europe was the movement of Pan-Europeanism proposed by a Japanese Austrian, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, who thought to rebuild the Europe from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains just like a federation of the United States. His idealistic thought has become an underlying basis to build a common community among European nations and peoples as the European Community in 1967 and thereafter the European Union in 1993.

As Gene Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, British scholars of government at Dartmouth College, instruct us that the political framework of Post Westphalia found a way to maintain independence of all members as a part of the international system. Each member state enjoyed sovereignty over a given territory and pursued its own interests without intervening and destroying each other. Through the exercise of sovereignty, governments of member states maintained the capacity to provide order (Lyons and Mastanduno, 1995: 5). In this sense, European society was realigned as the “inter-national society” based on territorially defined units of political authority which in principle accepted one another as equals and captured by the cobweb of negotiations and compromises between member states being apart from their intention to come together or not. After the Peace of Westphalia, even if some member state, especially the Habsburg, wanted to become a sole winner by excluding others, no one could win the final victory to rule the whole of Europe, and all of member states were eventually compelled to have negotiations and compromise with other member states.

In our argument on the nation state and its sovereignty, we have to keep careful watch over two aspects. One of which is the internal sovereignty, and each nation state can hold supreme authority, maintain domestic order and exercise to rule exclusively within its border and the people living in it. In other words, this is the territorial integrity, in which there is no higher authority than the nation state concerned. Each nation state has its own hierarchal central government headed by an elected decision maker as the veto player, whether president, prime minister or chancellor, and its central bureaucracy with appointed administrative officers, and has the congress consisted of the elected representatives to make laws to regulate and care after the people. This is the basis of internal governance that is legitimized to levy taxes for maintaining not only the regulative and repressive state apparatus of bureaucracy, police, army and judiciary, but also the entitlement state apparatus to secure pension and insurance for the well-being and welfare of the people.

Another one is the external sovereignty, and each nation state has its own right and its own border to be independent and to be defended from other nation states without oppressive intervention. This means that each nation state should not be surrendered and mandated to be invaded and ruled by other nation states. Each nation state is in principle built on an equation of sovereignty and political autonomy, but there is no pure sovereignty. If there is a pure sovereignty, it would be only a privilege of the most powerful and mightiest state like an empire. Since there is no possibility that any closed nation state has a perfect autarkic economy and a perfect political autonomy closed to the outside, each nation state has to depend on other nation states by exchanging products and foods and by mingling with the people of other nation states.

Thus, each nation state cannot survive without being dependent on and having mutual relations with other nation states. It means the indispensable dependency on the external surroundings, and each nation state cannot but apply to the change of such external surroundings just as the breakdown of the apotheosized Japanese Emperor System and the Third Empire in Germany in 1945, or the collapse of Cold War system in 1989. The ways to maintain sovereignty would therefore be changed according to the change of external surroundings as in the case of revolutionary changes in East European countries and the old Soviet Union since 1989 to the early 1990s. There is another case of evolutionary transformation of a gradual democratization of absolutist, totalitarian, and authoritarian regimes in Iran, North Korea and China in the near or long future.
Theoretically summing up, as Friedrich Kratochwil, German professor of IR at the European University Institute in Florence, emphasizes, “If domestically sovereignty never meant supreme “power” but rather meant the quality of a claim to authority that could “bind” all subjects, then internationally sovereignty cannot be equated simply to power wielded by a self-interested (rational) actor, since part and parcel of playing the international game consists in recognizing the sovereignty of others” (Kratochwil, 1995: 25). As he suggests by taking an example of an individual property, internal sovereignty of a nation state cannot insist limitlessly its supremacy, but it has to be limited if there is a claim from a subject who wants to possess his or her property, to guard his or her ownership and to claim to the authority of the government of his or her nation state. At the same time, even if he or she wants to claim exclusively all of subjects, i.e. all of human beings, have their own property, it would be accompanied by its responsibility and obligation. That is why ownership is not absolute but is subject to limits on its use.

Just the same as his example, when we investigate the complicated processes of the European integration, a sovereign nation state has to delegate its authority upward to the EU, but a nation state would not mandate all of its authorities to the EU. If the EU wants to deprive forcibly a member state of its authorities, any member state would not accept, complain about it and resist to the EU. Thus, while considerable parts of authorities of all member states are delegated to the EU, as he describes, “The process would be compatible to control of and access to intangible assets rather than a process in which sovereignty moves from national to supranational loci of power” (Kratochwil, 1995: 28). Therefore, there are limits on sovereignty, especially in the responsibility and obligation that every sovereign nation state owes to the people as its constituent members. Similar to it, every sovereign nation state has its responsibility and its obligation to behave sincerely to other sovereign nation states. As for the EU, this supranational organization is delegated considerable authorities from its member states and has the supremacy to them, but it has never deprived them of their sovereignty completely.

According to Kees van Kersbergen, Robert Lieshout and Grahame Lock at the University of Nijimegen in the Netherlands, the EU is neither a new federal state nor a mere intergovernmental pact, but it is still primarily an intergovernmental bargain between member states. Accordingly, while this bargain has obviously had an impact on the political autonomy of member states, it has not affected their sovereignty, and states are still the prime movers (Kersbergen, Lieshout, Lock, 1999: 14–15). They want to insist that member states have delegated only their political autonomy to the EU, but they have not at all abandoned their sovereignty. However, as Kratochwil’s argument shows us, all of member states of the EU have already changed their ways to maintain their sovereignty according to the change of external surroundings for these 60 years, for newcomers for 20 or 10 years.

The architecture of the EU has already been taken root the ways of multilevel governance at three dimensions of supranational, national and subnational, which has the constellational strata of macro, meso and micro. Among old member states, a sense of identity with the EU has already been embedded deeply. Thomas Risse, German political scientist of foreign security policy at Free University in Berlin, describes that the Europe and the nation are both “imagined communities,” and many people who strongly identify with their nation state also feel a sense of belonging to the Europe (Risse, 2004: 248). Just the same as the European people, while every member state feels a sense of belonging to the EU, it maintains its identity with its own sovereignty. In this sense, every member state which identifies strongly with its own sovereignty also feels a sense of belonging to the supranational community of the EU.

In sum, it is very important to take account that the ways of a nation state to identify with its sovereignty would be changed according to the change of external surroundings. If a supranational community like the EU appears on the stage, every member state would be swung as to which its identity with the supranational community or its identity with its own state sovereignty should be prior. This is also the problem of regionalism which would bring about the convergence or the divergence from the regional community. At present, there is only one regional supranational community that either the people or the nation state would be requested to answer the question which should be prior the identity with the supranational community or the identity with the sovereignty of their own nation state. It would be earnestly deliberated how to make a respectable supranational community in all of regions cross the world. In the long future, the answer to this question will be given all over the world except the people and member states affiliated to the EU. However, it does not mean global or regional governance without any nation state.

3.2 Hyper Neo-Realism and the Anarchical Society

Since the postwar period up to now, the presence of sovereignty has been transformed from the “inter-national society” as the political framework of the Peace of Westphalia into the “trans-national society” as that of Post Westphalia. Though the Westphalian model of state sovereignty has long been for understanding the realities of politics, it has recently become inadequate. That is why this framework is merely based on the premise that nation states are only actors and movers. However, as long as globalization is another expression of the reciprocal interdependency composed of a wide variety of relations not only between nation states but also between other actors, global society is not the inter-national society between nation states, but the trans-national society of a variety of multiple actors including nation states. There is for all that a simple thought if globalization is advanced more than before, the roles of nation states would be hollowed out and replaced with the market mechanism. It is not necessary for us to listen to such a simple view. But, it is an incorrigible view that reciprocal relations at the global level are based on activities and roles of nation states only.
Taking an example of global economy, Peter Dicken, British professor emeritus of geographical political economy at the University of Manchester, wants to persuade us that governance of the international economy is synonymous with the government of nation states as they exerted their legitimized control over their sovereign territories. Every government, whatever its political complexion, intervenes to varying degrees in the operation of the market. The state has been the primary regulator of its national economic system, and it has played and continues to play a fundamental role in the economic development of all countries. Therefore, the state remains a most significant force in shaping the world economy. Since the world economy can be conceptualized as a set of interlocking national economies, trade and investment in the world economy are literally “inter-national” (Dicken, 1998: 79; Dicken, 2007: 173).

Sad to say, Dicken’s point of view is too simple to go beyond a sort of state-centrism, so that we cannot accept his standpoint. As he says, it is fact that every government of nation states intervene in the operation of market mechanism. However, vice versa, the market as the private for-profit sector is also qualified to intervene in the process of economic policy making by the government as the public sector. Thus, the relations between the government and the market have been and are mutually interdependent. Today, governance activities in politics and economics are interconnected more than ever and they have solid mutual relations like a woven cobweb. Needless to say, in the household of global economy, not only its interdependence but also its interconnection has increased dramatically. The same can be said of the transnational political system which can best be depicted as a web of interdependency, involving national governments, international organizations, transnational organizations and transnational bodies. Such a framework emphasizes both the permeability of nation states and the polycentric nature of the global political system, with nation states as a mere one level in the complex system of overlapping and often competing agencies of governance.

Along with Dicken, hyper neo-realists such as Kenneth Waltz, professor emeritus of IR at the University of California Berkeley and the first major advocate of neo-realism or structural realism of his coinage, have been consistently defending that nation states are the only major actors in global politics. He does not consider domestic characters of each nation state and emphasizes the structures of inter-state relations. For him, on the one hand, as long as all of nation states have the same functions, they are equal and equivalent units. As long as they have no higher authority, they would be in the condition of anarchy. However, on the other hand, he insists as the system is resulted from fear of domination by others, each nation state tries to maximize its own status in relation with others. In addition, he lays emphasis on that the system is shaped on a fear of domination by others, and the shape of the system is therefore determined by relations between the great powers which have most resources and capabilities to dissolve fear of nation states. And thus, the balance of power between them is the determinant of mechanisms of world politics. As a consequence, the system during the post-war period up to 1989 has been determined by the balance of power between two great powers, i.e. the United States and the Soviet Union.

His arguments of world politics seem contradictory for us, but not for him. He describes nation states are functionally equal and equivalent units, and, on the contrary, they cannot dissolve their fear of domination by others. That is why they are willing to go under the umbrella of the great powers to make and maintain their units. His world politics of inter-state relations are based on the units of belonging to the great powers. He moreover insists that nation states should not be replaced with other non-state actors, and the stronger a state gets, the more powerful become the incentives for other states to retain their balance of power through the external balancing by making alliances and the internal balancing by military build-ups. Because any central authority and any sovereign body as a source of global order, which can govern other nation states, can enforce agreements, remove a threat to security and maintain the balance of power, is absent from the anarchical inter-national system. Waltz highlights, in this point, this anarchy of inter-national system composed of nation states are decisively different from the order in the domestic system (Waltz, 1979; Waltz, 1993; Waltz, 2000; Waltz, 2008).

Though the theory of structural realism of Waltz criticizes the classical realism of Morgenthau and others as based on the reductionism and endeavors to explain the structure of international system by adopting the deductive holism, Waltz’s defensive realism that the pursuit for security is the most important sources for every nation state behaviors is now criticized by the offensive realism of power maximization such as John Mearsheimer at the University of Chicago that the acquisition of power for survival is the most important factors for every nation state behaviors. If Waltz wants to persuade us, he should at least examine the following points of Robert Gilpin, professor emeritus of international affairs at Princeton University, who expresses the same standpoint of state-centric realism as Waltz and shows his own basis of the hegemonic stability theory (HST). The reason why nation states are willing to go under the umbrella of the great powers, that is, they want to subject to the great powers, and, according to Gilpin, smaller and weak states will accept hegemony is to lead to favorable solutions by cheaper cost than to come in antagonism with the dominant power or hegemon. Therefore, the hegemon does not oppress forcibly smaller and weak states, but they want to accept willingly rules and orders of the hegemon.

Gilpin makes sure his standpoint of state-centric realism which recognizes the central role of the state and emphasizes the state is the principal actor in international affairs, while his analysis focuses on the behavior of individual states which has no authority superior to their sovereign political units. From this viewpoint, he criticizes Waltz’s systemic realism or structural realism to make a point that the distribution of power among states is the principal determinant of state behavior within an international system. Gilpin consequently stresses that both strong international leadership and an effective international governance structure are required to create effective international
regimes to solve the compliance problem. Regimes in themselves cannot provide governance structure because they lack the most critical component of governance, or the power to enforce compliance (Gilpin, 2001: 15–16, 84, 97–98).

As understood in a flash, Gilpin is also fairly contradicted. While he denies Waltz’s logic that the distribution of power among states is the principal determinant of state behavior and he insists an effective international governance structure is not a system to distribute power among states, he introduces the logic that a strong leadership as the hegemon should be appeared to solve the compliance problem. So that, his logic is resulted in who brings the stability, and his answer is of course by the strong leadership of a hegemonic state. Accordingly, the logic that individual states have no authority superior to their sovereign political units is deviated from his theory of hegemonic stability. In the last resort, he is driven into a corner to exchange the Waltz’s logic of fear of domination by others for his own logic of seeking interests under the umbrella of the strong leadership of the hegemon. Both logics are destined to be criticized not only by neo-liberals and constructivists but also by other neo-realists.

By the way, the most important problem as to what causes anarchy is left with not yet given any reliable answer by neo-realists. Then, we will scrutinize the logic of Hedley Bull, the late British professor of IR at Oxford University, who was also a leading scholar of the English school. As he points out, global society consists of the elements of transnational solidarity and conflict cutting across the divisions among sovereign nation states. He thinks global society is composed of sovereign states, and the concept of global system means the system based on sovereign states. Thus, he differentiates global system from global society. He discriminates two concepts, on the one hand, global system is the world of Hobbes, in which members are doing only antagonistic interactions between them, and therefore any social contract has not yet concluded. On the other hand, global society is the world of Grotius, in which members are doing favorable behaviors to make consensus, and a kind of social contract has already concluded. When members of global system grow up into a kind of groups of sovereign nation states and become aware of their common interests and common values, global society would be made up (Bull, 1977/2002: 23–26, 38–40, 230–231, 252–254).

It is unfortunate for Bull that the concept of global system and the concept of global society are not different each other. Because two concepts are synonymous for us as long as both are composed of only sovereign nation states. It is the normal condition that there are relations of antagonism, conflict, bargaining, compromise, reconciliation, association, cooperation and alliance between them. We can accordingly interpret that such a distinction has only a demarcation of the degree and the extent. On the one hand, his global system composed of sovereign nation states is an unorganized set of them under natural conditions. On the other hand, his global society composed of sovereign states is an organized set of them under social conditions. If there is a means of bargaining and reconciliation, an unorganized set, i.e. the world of Hobbes, could be transformed into an organized set, i.e. the world of Grotius, and two sets or two groups could make a consensus and have their common interests and common values. Hence, we can understand he was not aware that members of both global system and global society should not be limited to only sovereign nation states. Rather, members should be enlarged to multiple actors including other transnational organizations, TNCs, NGOs and NPOs.

He accepts the anarchical framework which is made up of the domain of self-help, and defined international relations as the politics of autonomous states without a common superior. In a paradoxical meaning, his logic may be used as the grounds to stand in opposition to unilateralism of the United States in the1990s and the early 2000s in parallel with his concept of “new medievalism” (Bull, 1977/2002: 254–266). It stands to reason that if global society would be an anarchical society with no common superior as he insisted, there would be no possibility to be ruled by the dictatorship or the unilateral empire and the like. In that case, there is a possibility global society would be transformed into multi core consortia based on multilateralism just as the EU. Though each member state has its sovereignty and is independent from other member states each other, the EU is constituted as a sort of unified nations by the upward devolution from sovereign member states. The present situation of the EU is however far from the Kantian idealistic world of peaceful union which has no standing army and is managed by a republican form of unified government. We can nevertheless refer to the EU as one of the future model for making a regional community and its good governance in other areas.

As already mentioned, it is a matter of course that at the global level there is no solitary authority like the world government which is the same as a sovereign nation state at the national level. If it is the obvious fact, we may leave that global society has no core of governance and no single consensus making system. When we are asked about it, we will answer “No” at once. It is essential for global society to have a kind of authorized body which is qualified to put different ideas and interests of multiple actors together, to make a consensus among them and to cease and reconcile conflicts between them. At present, there are mere collective bargaining consortia just as the UN and other transnational organizations based on a large number of transnational contracts between sovereign nation states at the global level.

However, at the global level, every nation state is not the only primary actor, but only the most important actor among multiple actors. Under such collective bargaining consortia or being in parallel with them, there are substructures of multiple actors which are composed of TNCs, NGOs and NPOs. It is needless to say actors just as the UN and other transnational organizations are not superiors, and actors just as TNCs, NGOs and NPOs are not inferiors. The former has virtually more power and more authority than the latter. But, there is no hierarchical difference between them, and actors just as TNCs, NGOs and NPOs are in principle equal to transnational collective consortia in their qualification to participate in global and transnational activities. We should accept there is such a normative standard of qualification between multiple actors.
3.3 Cosmopolitan Polity and the Dynamism of Fragmentation/Convergence

As it is, not a little ironical, on the ground that there is a complex system of global governance, hyper globalists such as Daniele Archibugi, a prominent advocate of cosmopolitan democracy and doubles as Italian professor of governance and public policy at the University of London and a research director at the Italian National Research Council in Rome, want to emphasize globalization brought about that nation states are no longer primary actors, progressively losing their oligarchic power and completely hollowing out. According to him, the political project of cosmopolitan democracy is very simply expressed as the attempt to reconcile the phenomenon of globalization with the success of democracy, and it sets out from the fact that state based democracy risks being hollowed out by the process of globalization. While cosmopolitan democracy is but one of the possible forms of global governance, and one that tilts heavily toward a democratic management of the global commons, it may best be conceived of as involving different levels of governance, which are bound not necessarily by hierarchical ties but rather by a set of functional relations at the five dimensions of local, state, interstate, regional and global. He says such different levels of governance are mutually autonomous but complementary (Archibugi, 2003: 261; Archibugi, 2008: 86, 89, 97).

As we can grasp his arguments at a glance, he refers to only two points. One of which is that with the progress of globalization, nation states are hollowed out and lost their oligarchic power, and as a result they are no longer primary actors. Second one is that cosmopolitan democracy is only a possible form of global governance to reconcile globalization with democracy to manage the global commons. However, he does not make sure the grounds how and when nation states are hollowed out, what cosmopolitan democracy is, how it can reconcile with globalization, and how it can manage global commons. For that purpose, it is convenient for us to listen to and examine the arguments of David Held, professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science and the keystone of cosmopolitan democracy.

According to Held, complex global systems, from the financial to the ecological, connect the fate of communities in one locale to the fate of communities in distant regions of the world. Since regional groups have sought to consolidate their relations with each other and their interregional diplomacy has intensified, regionalism has not been a barrier, rather has been as a building block for globalization. While many states retain the ultimate legal claim to effective supremacy over what occurs within their own territories, this claim has to be understood in relation to the expanding jurisdiction of institutions of global and regional governance and the constrains and the obligations of new forms of international regulation. Therefore, there has been a transformation or an unbundling of the relationship between sovereignty, territoriality, and political outcomes.

And thus, global governance is a multi actor complex in so far as agencies participate in the development of global public policy. However, this broad pluralistic conception does not presume that all states or interests have an equal voice in and an equal influence over its agenda or programs. Such an evolving complex is far from a coherent system of global governance, with ultimate legal authority and the means to uphold international law, but it is much more than a system of limited international cooperation. Accordingly, global governance presents a thickening web of multilateral agreements, institutions, regimes and transgovernmental policy networks has evolved, intervening in and regulating many aspects of national and transnational life.

Meanwhile, cosmopolitan democracy is defined as new political institutions which would coexist with the system of states, but which would override states in transnational and international spheres of activity. It is the formal construction of new democratic institutions, and at the same time the construction of broad avenues of civic participation in and deliberation over decision-making at regional and global levels. It would need to create an effective and accountable political, administrative and regulative capacity at global and regional levels to complement those at national and local levels. To establish a cosmopolitan polity, an overarching network of democratic public fora would be necessary covering cities, nation states, regions and the wider transnational order. Therefore, it would need to restructure the territorial boundaries of systems of accountability, and escape the control of a nation state to bring under better democratic control. Moreover, it would need to rethink the role and place of regional and global regulatory and functional agencies which provide a more coherent and effective focal point in public affairs by focusing on the institutional components of the cosmopolitan model. With the UN as its institutional core, this global regulatory and functional agencies comprise a vast range of formal suprastate bodies and regional organizations, as well as regimes and transnational policy networks embracing government officials, technocrats, corporate representatives, pressure groups and NGOs (Held, 2006: 305–309; Held, 2007a: 193–195; Held, 2007b: 249–255).

In his context, Held tries to answer the questions over how and when nation states are hollowed out, what cosmopolitan democracy is, how it can reconcile with globalization, and how it can manage global commons. He assumes firstly the cosmopolitan political body which should realize his cosmopolitan democracy as new regional and global suprastate institutions which have agencies with an effective and accountable capacity in politics, administration and regulation. Secondly, to start with a global supranational institution means to reconcile with globalization. He shows on this point an optimistic thinking such a supranational institution will be able to override and hollow out nation states, and at the same time to coexist with the system of states. That is to say, he presumes after nation states are hollowed out and a considerable number of functions which existing nation states have as their own system are delegated, a global supranational institution should take over these functions from hollowed-out nation states. Thirdly,
based on such a premise, he suggests a global and regional body or institution should probably be a kind of upgraded version of the UN and the EU, which embraces officials, technocrats, corporate representatives, pressure groups and NGOs. When such a formal supranational body similar to the UN and the EU is built both at the global level and at the regional level, his cosmopolitan democratic body will come into existence.

Globalization has been consistently asking a question as to whether the sovereignty which has been thought of an illimitable, indivisible and exclusive right of nation states would be displaced by global networks, or a multi actor complex in terms of Held, not only at the global level but also at the regional level. It is sure this problem has been presenting the sovereignty of nation states has to be conceived as already divided among regional and transnational agencies. Most ironical of all, today’s transnational consortia and transnational agencies are consortia constituted not by the amalgamation, but by the aggregation of member actors, as typical of the UN, even if it has major five members exercising their veto power, rather than the centripetal government of a nation state. Therefore, the sovereignty of nation states has not yet wholly divided among regional and transnational agencies, even in the case of the EU. Moreover, up to now, there would not be a favorable condition to create the single global polity like a world government as a core framework of making and implementing global public policies. In addition, there would not be an essential condition to realize cosmopolitan laws in terms of Held for fulfilling the global justice. Though Held maybe imagines an upgraded version of the UN and the EU which embraces officials, technocrats, corporate representatives, pressure groups and NGOs, how can he make up the framework of executive system without a hierarchy monopolized by elite officials which comprehends a diversity of representatives being heterogeneous each other?

In this point, we have to listen to what Nancy Fraser, professor of philosophy and politics at the New School for Social Research, now a college of the New School University in New York, says. She refers to the failure of frame setting. "Because what is at stake here is the process by which first-order-political space is constituted, I shall call this injustice meta-political misrepresentation. Meta-political misrepresentation arises when states and transnational elites monopolize the activity of frame-setting, denying voice to those who may be harmed in the process, and blocking where the latter’s claims can be vetted and redressed. The effect is to exclude the overwhelming majority of people from participation in the mea-discourses that determine the authoritative division of political space. Lacking any institutional arenas for such participation, and submitted to an undemocratic approach to the "how," the majority is denied the chance to engage on terms of parity in decision-making about the "who". (Fraser, 2009: 26).

If Held’s cosmopolitan polity fails to constitute the frame of executive system which can exclude the monopoly of transnational elites, the frame-setting creation of democratic arenas would be wrecked by excluding other representatives of technocrats, corporate representatives, pressure groups and NGOs. What is the problem of Held here is whether his cosmopolitan polity can make up the hierarchical structure which does never exclude, but includes certainly a variety of heterogeneous representatives, and simultaneously whether it can give the chance of parity to participate in the discourse and engage in the process of decision making of global public policy. Over this point, we cannot find out his positive proof, so that we cannot but say Held’s idea of cosmopolitan governance is far from a reality. He can by no means require a reality to make approaches to his idea, rather his idea would be required to make every effort to access to a reality. With much regret, his idealistic framework of making a cosmopolitan polity as it is cannot persuade us who are advocates of networking of multi level actors.

In contrast to Held, but a little standing in well with Held, Wolfgang Reinicke, director of global finance and global public policy networks at the Global Public Policy Institute, a UN initiative, emphasizes firstly globalization is a continuous process of increasing cross-border economic flows and political affairs. In this sense, the terms of globalization and interdependence are able to be used interchangeably. Hence, globalization seems likely to be instrumental in determining whatever international structure will replace the existing system. It is therefore requisite to examine the sources of conflict arising from the growing tension between globalization and governance and its institutions.

Secondly, the concept of governance, whether national, regional or global, should not be defined to be equated with the ability of the government of a nation state to exercise public policy. In turn, governance has been conventionally defined to be the governing policy within communities, of course including a nation state, as embodied in its legislative and judicial enactments which serve as a basis for determining what acts are to be regarded as contrary to the public good. There has been a common sense among the public that neither interdependence nor globalization can challenge the operational sovereignty of the government which has the ability to conduct public policy. Such a false awareness should be changed into an insight for a strategy of global public policy such as the delinking of some elements of the operational aspects of internal sovereignty (government) from its territorial foundation (nation state) and its institutional and legal environment (government). Such a strategy would cut across national boundaries in order to match up the political geography. Therefore, the current state of global governance consists of cross national patchworks for global public policy, and these patchworks can evolve into networks of governance that can operationalize internal sovereignty in the global economy. First step of which is the global governance audit, and the next is to fill the gaps and establish the links in each policy domain.

Thirdly, as for the external sovereignty, it portrays relationship between other nation states, which are functional equivalents in the international system with the absence of a central authority. Consequently, economic interdependence is a challenge to the operational dimension of external sovereignty. Focusing on the regulatory and
supervisory dimension of public policy, it should be examined how globalization has compromised the ability of the
government to regulate and supervise a variety of economic activities to preserve what is in the public interests by
providing public goods. Though the external sovereignty of nation states as international relations between them should
not be violated, the operational sovereignty to make and implement a global public policy has de facto been lost and
this has already been delegated to transnational consortia like the UN and other organizations.

Fourthly, as for the participatory gap, non-state organizations have been perceived themselves as excluded from
policy decision making process. However, while civil society organizations as well as private corporations have
successfully reorganized themselves on a transnational scale, using various forms and varying degrees of influence to
make their interests count in international politics. As a result, nation states are no longer the sole determinants of the
international system, they are facing difficulties in implementing internal as well as external sovereignty. As
interdependence and globalization have continued to proceed, nation states are demanding greater effectiveness and
efficiency in their work, while being less supportive when it comes to finance their operations. In particular global
organizations, such as the UN, suffer from the contradiction between ambition and demand on the one side, and the lack
of funding and political backing on the other. In this regard, it is obvious that international organizations face a stiff
uphill battle in their attempt to please deliver on both ends (Reinicke, 1998: 4–6, 87, 228; Reinicke, 2000: 3, 28, 61–69,

In addition to the context mentioned above, Reinicke wants to emphasize that multisectoral networks can perform all
manner of functions that bring together the public sector, the private sector and civil society organizations in
transnational negotiations or implementation networks. The term of multisectoral networks is his coinage to throw into
relief networks can fulfill important matters of all sorts in the current system of decentralized global governance and
coordinate the balance between organization and informality, weak versus strong ties, binding versus non-binding
agreements. Though the concept of governance has been apt to define as the use of political authority and the exercise
of control in society in relation to the management of its resources, governance at the global level has been becoming
complex more than ever.

Together with it, actors have become more and more multiple and their relations, whether within or beyond borders,
have been broadened and complicated. In some cases, transnational non state interests and groups have managed to
almost fully transcend control by nation states. Those people and groups who held demonstrations against the G8
summit and WTO conference are the typical examples which are prone to be deviated from the existing rules and
standards. Other typical examples are vividly exhibited in networks of terrorists such as Al Quida or transnational
networks of organized crime of the Mafia. Reinicke thinks to resolve the problem of these deviated groups by networks
between the UN and its specialized agencies. They can play a number of roles in networks as convener, provider of a
platform and safe space, social entrepreneur, norm entrepreneur, multilevel network manager and capacity builder
(Reinicke, 2000: 97). Reinicke wants to design the framework of global collective action by networks together the UN
and its specialized organizations with the private sectors of TNCs and NGOs. Over this point, we will compare with the
arguments of James Rosenau, professor of international affairs at George Washington University and is famous for his
coinage of “governance without government.”

Reinicke’s concept of globalization is narrowly defined as the dynamism of economic activities beyond borders.
However, Rosenau’s concept of globalization is in contrast broadly conceived the dynamism to be the processes that
underlie the expansion of human activities beyond national boundaries. It contributes to expansivity consist of
economic, social, cultural, religious, political and communication activities that result in flows of people, ideas, goods,
money, pollution, disease, norms, authority and practices across borders. All of the issues that mark the present world
are incrementally shaped by the dynamics of fragmentation. Of the numerous change dynamics presently shaping world
affairs, two clusters stand out as paramount, those that foster globalization, centralization, and integration on the one
hand and those that promote localization, decentralization, and fragmentation on the other. As for us, this means the
dynamics of convergence and divergence between core and periphery. While these polarities move the course of events
in opposite directions, they are continuously, simultaneously, and often casually interactive, give rise to the prime
tension with which individuals and their collectivities must contend.

That there are many globalizations and they are overlapped each other deepens on the complexity of the empirical
circumstances, but it is also the case within any of the globalizations, all of which are marked by a multiplicity of
diverse actors. Therefore, the process of globalization and localization tends to be one and the same. There are the
number of and variety of sources that contribute to and sustain the processes of fragmentation. First one is “the skill
revolution,” wherein people are able to construct scenarios that trace back into their homes and pocketbooks. Second
one is collectivities around the world are undergoing authority crises that prevent from framing and moving toward the
goals. Third one is the bifurcation of global structures whereby the long standing state centric world is encountered with
an emergent multi centric world of diverse actors such as ethnic minorities, NGOs, professional societies, transnational
corporations, and many other types of private collectivities. Fourth one is the “organized explosion,” a huge
proliferation of associations and networks at every level of communities. Fifth one is the “mobility upheaval,” the vast
and ever growing movement of people from the tourist to the terrorists around the world. Sixth one is the microelectronic
and transportational technology that have collapsed time and space. Seventh one is the complex
processes through which territoriality, states, and sovereignty have weakened, in some cases replaced by mediascapes,
 financescapes, ethnoscapes, and ideoscapes. Eighth one is that national economies have been globalized. These eight major sources interactively generate and sustain the dynamics of fragmentation.

There are powerful tendencies toward globalization that not only underlie the shifting of boundaries, the relocation of authorities, the weakening of states, and the proliferation of NGOs, but they also provoke equally powerful tendencies toward localization that give rise to further consequences of this sort. If the interactions of sovereign states in an anarchical world lie at the heart of the old ontology, at the center of the new one are the interactions of globalizing and localizing forces, of tendencies toward integration and fragmentation that are simultaneous and interactive as collapse into an erratic but singular process labeled fragmentation. States become only one of many sources of authority, only one of many organizations through which the dynamics of fragmentation shape the course of events. Instead of initially positing a world dominated by states and national governments, the new ontology of spheres of authorities (SOA) are consistent with the division of territorial space and are subject to considerable flux. Since authority is conceived not as a possession of actors, nor as embedded roles, rather authority is relational, its existence can only be observed when it is both exercised and complied with (Rosenau, 2006a: 1–3; Rosenau, 2006b: 29–31, 39–40, 107–116, 178–180; Rosenau, 2006c: 9–12, 16–17, 70–71, 74–76, 99–101, 115–119, 155–157, 173–178, 181–188; Rosenau, 2008: 53–55, 63–70, 102–106).

As obviously taken in a flash, Rosenau changed his old catchphrase of “governance without government,” and as the new key concept, instead of states and national governments, he proposes “spheres of authorities.” As he mentions, his new ontology does not depend on whether actors possess spheres of authorities or not, but whether such a relational authority is exercised or not. However, he does not refer to the subject exercising a relational authority, that is who takes the role of coordination and facilitation in the wriggle of dynamic fragmentation. Under the condition undergoing authority crisis and weakening the nation state and its government, he does not perform his role as a trigger only by referring to organized explosion by associations and networks. Dynamic movement of associations and networks are useless if they are converged to a kind of groups and organizations to make their consensus and introduce them to the new direction. On the point of mobility upheaval, he does not perform his duty only by showing us the vast and ever growing movement, especially the one of terrorists. As everyone knows, terrorists are the organization which has deviated from the existing rules and norms.

As already mentioned, we agree with including terrorists as the opponents of negotiation to induce in the end of the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. In this sense, on the one hand, we cannot but say he is prone to convert from substantialism to functionalism. On the other hand, we can understand he is also prone to convert from modernist to postmodernist. Because he emphasizes continually the dynamics of fragmentation, the term of which has been highlighted the condition without the core by many postmodernists, among others, the late philosopher Jean-Franc¸ois Lyotard. If he wants to represent the dynamism of globalization, he has to describe not only the movement of fragmentation, but also the movement of convergence toward the core. In short, the dynamism of globalization has two ways of movement, convergence and divergence. The term of fragmentation expresses the process of two ways movement by a diversity of actors. As a result, we should show the flag of “governance including government,” instead of his old catchword of “governance without government.”

Intergovernmental organizations, created by nation states to facilitate and coordinate international collective action to reap joint benefits, are also under pressure. There are a few people to consider the idea that society, whether global or national, could be organized without the state and the central government, and therefore “governance without government” would be possible. In opposition to such a viewpoint, we certified an anarchical society would not make its function work (Yamamoto, 2008). A kind of core caucus is requisite to supervise and manage governing systems and processes as a whole. Such a caucus is known well as transnational consortia, for example, the UN, IMF, WTO, World Bank and NATO at the global level, and also the central government with the central core executives of the bureaucracy in each sovereign nation state at the national level. It is the fact that there is no authorized central government to supervise and manage not only all of sovereign nation states, but also all of transnational organizations as TNCs, NGOs and NPOs all over the world.

Though it has no central government, global society is not an anarchical society, which is obliged to be the domain of self-help relied on its own power and its own ability as Bull insisted. Global society is rather a networked society which is composed of multiple collective bargaining consortia with a decision making system by bargaining, consensus making and reconciliation between members. Such a networked society is characterized that sovereign nation states and its collective bargaining consortia just as the UN are not only independent actors of global governance, but also other actors of TNCs, NGOs and NPOs are qualified to be independent actors of global governance. Among other actors, abilities of NGOs and NPOs are still very weak, and they may not perform fully their roles and duties. However, as Andrew Hurrell, director of international studies at Oxford University, says, their networks can contribute to the development, diffusion, and implementation of an increasing range of norms, rules, and regulations, covering issues which range from banking supervision to securities, to antitrust regulations, and to health policy they generate rules and principles, often filling in and expanding what has been negotiated at a formal inter-state level (Hurrell, 2007: 98).

Such independent actors have been increasingly involved in cross border processes of their mutual reciprocal relations and have been interwoven networks of global governance to rely on each other and help each other. If a conflict occurs, for example, over the problem to share interests of oil and gas provisions or to solve the problem of
environmental pollution and global warming, there is no alternative that one of collective bargaining consortia embarks upon its activities and tries to propose its agenda to reconcile with both sides of actors involved and settle the matter of differences. In this sense, we can assert international public goods to be only club goods of member actors. This is the present situation of global governance whether proper or not. For this reason, the present structure of global society is quite different from the structure of each sovereign nation state, which has the central government to have a power to make its norms and rules as laws and to order its members to obey to itself. If its members do not want to obey to existing norms and rules, each nation state and its central government has the right to use its public violence, police or army, as a means of taking sanctions.

It is needless to say while globalization means to broaden economic flows and political and social interdependency beyond borders, subjects of management of global public goods, for example, solution of conflicts, arms control, political stability, the reservation of environment and peacekeeping are fulfilled not only by supranational consortia of the aggregation of nation states. In parallel with it, consortia of TNCs have also begun to attend partially the management of global public goods, for example, finance, technology, information and property. In addition, NGOs and NPOs have begun to attend partially the management of global public goods of the reservation of environment, peacekeeping and human rights. We have to restructure the established order and grope for an alternative institutionalization not only by transforming the existing transnational consortia between sovereign nation states, but also by making an alternative comprehensive system which includes not only nation states but also a lot of other actors.

When we want to fumble for such a system, we cannot but realize there is a deep cleavage between governance at the global level and governance at the national level. Unless such a cleavage between them is dwindled, any organizations and associations without the government would not be given to participate in multiple activities not only in global society but also in transnational society.

4. Conclusive Remarks: Transnational Advocacy Networks and PPPs

Any nation state has existed up to now and continues to exist from now on as a collective body, which is composed of the conjunction of the state and civil society. Any nation state retains in future its sovereignty to the outside, whether global society or transnational region. Any sovereign state, whether it adopts the presidential system or the parliamentary cabinet system, has its own central government and its own hierarchical administrative bureaucracy as the veto player, the role of which is to supervise and manage from the top to the below. The function of the central government is able to be decentralized and delegated to the subnational local authorities at the national level. If we discuss about the devolution of authorities from the center to the locality, we can say these delegations would bring the partial hollowing out of the state. However, we would never say it is the breakdown of such a collective body of conjunction. Because decentralized authority of the locality, i.e. local authorities or local governments, is supplemented by the central government. In turn, the central government is supported by many local authorities or local governments. Thus, at the national level, there are subsidiary relations between the central government and local governments. This is the mutual relationship of subsidiarity between the central government and local governments, which is able to understand a kind of public-public partnerships (PPPs) (G to G, G to G relations).

In parallel with it, the government, whether central or local, has also subsidiary relations between private corporations and NGOs and NPOs. These two private actors are qualified to deliver outsourced public services and participate partially in the advocacy framework to make decisions and implement them as a public policy. In this sense, there are multiple actors which are subsidiary each other at the national level. This subsidiary framework means co-governance between governments (the public sector) and private corporations (the private for-profit sector), which is G to B, B to G relations. Moreover, there should be subsidiary relations between governments and non-profit organizations (the private not-for-profit sector), which is G to N, N to G relations.

As is often pointed out, the subsidiary relations between the central government and local authorities consist of political power in the public sphere which aims to realize the public interest, on the one hand. On the other hand, two private sectors are primary components of civil society and subsidiary relations between these two sectors are of course social relations (B to N, N to B relations). Private corporations aim to win their own maximum private profits to store benefits and in contrast non-profits organizations want to gain money for their activities but do not aim to save profits to gain surplus values. In short, at the national level, there are relatively simple relations between the public sector and the other two private sectors. We have called these relations as co-governance by PPPs. A variety of agents and actors such as the private business sector and the civic nonprofit sector have appeared as subjects of public service providers as well as a part of decision making and policy evaluation alongside the public sector of governments. Such a current environment of multiple agents and actors participating in the public policy process are appropriately referred to as the multi-level governance.

For example, Vasudha Chhotray and Gerry Stoker, the former is lecturer of development studies at the University of East Anglia and the latter is professor of governance and politics at the University of Southampton, define the concept of governance. “Governance is about the rules of collective decision-making in settings where there are a plurality of actors or organizations and where no formal control system can dictate the terms of the relationship between these actors and organizations” (Chhotray and Stoker, 2009: 3, 76). We should adopt such a definition to external relations as
global governance at the global level relations. If we wish it to be good governance, it should necessarily have transparent, representative, accountable and participatory systems of institutions and procedures for public decision making whether domestic governance or global governance.

To transform the status-quo of a domestic system, as George Tsebelis, professor of political science at the University of California Los Angeles, who coined the term veto player as having a specific meaning, we have to make a framework in some cases to harmonize and in other cases to negotiate with institutional veto players as decision makers or policy makers (Tsebelis, 2002: 19). When we decide agendas proposed by institutional veto players are not to be useful and not to be accepted, we are obliged to propose our alternatives by making sure the public reason. As Tsebelis demarcates, while individual veto players are based on unanimity rule, collective veto players use qualified majority or simple majority for their decisions (Tsebelis, 2002: 61). Then, we may prefer collective veto players to individual veto players, if asked which veto players are preferable as subjects to change the status quo, whether domestic governance or global governance.

For realizing our alternative agenda setting to change the status quo, as Paul Sabatier, professor of environmental science and policy at the University of California Davis, proposes, it is inevitable for us to make a professional advocacy coalition framework (ACF). As the ACF scheme has knowledge and information necessary for policy making, policy implementation and policy evaluation, it can design ideas which have much influence in making public policy and deal with wicked problems involving substantial goal conflicts, important technical disputes. ACF moreover focuses on the interaction between advocacy coalitions within a policy subsystem. As a result of competition within the subsystem and events outside the subsystem, policy change will be brought about (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 9–10, 189, 196–198, 208–210). Though Sabatier says this framework spends a lot of time mapping the belief system policy elites and analyzing the conditions under which policy oriented learning across coalitions, we can use this framework to incubate and vitalize multiple actors not only at the national level but also at the global level.

When we apply ACF scheme as a tool of bottom-up governance to the PPPs scheme, we can make ACF work effectively to lobby, bargain and negotiate with the government and with other institutions. We can of course apply the ACF scheme to global governance by multiple actors. As Margaret Keck and Katharyn Sikkink, both are professors of political science respectively at Johns Hopkins University and at the University of Minnesota, propose that transnational advocacy networks are proliferating and their goals is to change the behavior of states and of international organizations. And multiple actors can frame issues to make comprehensible to target audiences, to attract attention and encourage action, and to fit with favorable institutional venues (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 2–4, 8, 116–120, 159–162, 199–200, 216–217).

In spite of the differences between national and transnational domains, the networks go well because it stresses fluid and open relations among committed and knowledgeable actors working in specialized issue areas. Actors of NGOs and NPOs have a lobbying or a negotiation with their own government, and simultaneously they have a lobbying with a transnational organization. By having lobbies with the government of a nation state and with transnational organizations, they can expect the boomerang pattern of influence, for example, to their domestic government by putting pressure from the outside.

Such a scheme of ACF would be able to shift pressures, bargaining and negotiation whether with the government, with private corporations, or even with NGOs and NPOs. By making ACF work well, we will extend the arena of activities and movements at the global level as well as at the national level. We do hope the road map will be made to empower multiple and multi-level actors who can advocate their own alternatives and make PPPs between the government and transnational organizations. By the reinforcement of advocacy relations simultaneously at the global level and at the national level, multi-level actors will be empowered more and more, and will be able to make the global linkage and to deconstruct our global society. While our coming future has a great amount of difficulties, we have to make up multitudes of formal organizations and institutions of network linkages everywhere in global society to authorize and legitimate the practice and participation of multiple actors at multi-levels. Such a program would be promoted by the endeavors of incubation and empowerment of a large number of positive citizens who are candidates of transnational advocacy coalition framework members joined through multiple network linkages.

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