

# A Study on the Functions of *Although*

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The purpose of this study is to review Iten's (1998, 2005) hypotheses which are based on Relevance Theory, to consider the functions of *although*, and to clarify what inference will be made in each usage. This study provides counterexamples against Iten, which are some cases of post-posed *although-clauses* that can be replaced with *but*. Then, I make an alternative hypothesis that *although* guides us to find the contradiction between *although-clauses* and the main clauses through inferences. Following main clauses, subordinate adverbial clauses are more coordinate-like (Mizuno, 2007), which also will affect the interpretation. One of the possible reasons for this could be because of 'End-focus.' It will enable post-posed *although-clauses* to behave like *but*.

Keywords: concessive / adversative / procedural information / assumptions / Relevance Theory

## 1. Introduction

Adversative connectives are used on a number of occasions. For English learners, it is important to know how to use them effectively. For most beginners of English, however, it is not always easy to know which adversative word to use as it is dependent on the context. For that reason, more research on connectives should be conducted. In this paper, I would like to clarify the core function of *although*; the "core function" means the function which is common in all the usages.

There are few previous studies on the functions of *although*. This paper focuses on some of the latest interesting pieces of research. One of them is on the basis of Relevance Theory, which seems to be more interesting and sophisticated in that the core function of *although* is defined. Take a look at the outline of the theory.

The theory is based on two general claims about the role of relevance in cognition and communication (Sperber & Wilson, 2005) as follows:

### I. Cognitive Principle of Relevance:

Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance.

### II. Communicative Principle of Relevance:

Every act of overt communication conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance. (pp. 470–471)

Blakemore (1987, 1989) claims that discourse connectives are effort-saving strategies that provide

information on how to make an inference in order to achieve relevance and help to derive cognitive effects without much trouble.

### 1. 1. Concepts and procedures

In Relevance Theory, utterance interpretation involves decoding which leads to an incomplete representation and inference, the result of which is a set of fully propositional representations; that is, utterance interpretation requires two basic tools: representation and computation (Iten, 1998, p. 89). In addition, there are two basic types in encoded meaning (Blakemore, 1987, 1989). One is conceptual meaning, which is associated with representation. The other is procedural meaning, which is associated with computation. It is assumed that the connectives have procedural meaning. In other words, discourse connectives contribute to the derivation of implicatures; that is, intended contextual assumptions and contextual effects (Blakemore, 1987, 1989; Hall, 2004, 2007; Iten 1998, 2005). Here are the definitions on explicatures and implicatures (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, p. 182):

(I) An assumption communicated by an utterance U is EXPLICIT [hence an “explicature”] if and only if it is a development of a logical form encoded by U.

[Note: in cases of ambiguity, a surface form encodes more than one logical form, hence the use of the indefinite here, “a logical form encoded by U”.]

(II) An assumption communicated by U which is not explicit is IMPLICIT [hence an “implicature”].

Carston (2004, pp. 3–4) takes up the following example in order to explain explicatures and implicatures.

(1) X: How is Mary feeling after her first year at university?

Y: She didn't get enough units and can't continue. (p. 3)

Imagine that, in the particular context, X understands that Y has communicated the following assumptions:

(2) a. MARY<sub>x</sub> DID NOT PASS ENOUGH UNIVERSITY COURSE UNITS TO QUALIFY FOR ADMISSION TO SECOND YEAR STUDY AND, AS A RESULT, MARY<sub>x</sub> CANNOT CONTINUE WITH UNIVERSITY STUDY.

b. MARY<sub>x</sub> IS NOT FEELING VERY HAPPY.

[Note: Small caps are used throughout to distinguish propositions/assumptions/ thoughts from natural language sentences; the subscripted x indicates that a particular referent has been assigned to the name ‘Mary’.] (p. 3)

Following the definitions above, Casrston (2004, p. 4) says that (2a) is an explicature of Y's utterance and (2b) is an implicature.

## 1. 2. The Purpose and Approach

The purpose of this study is to clarify the core function of *although*. Iten's (1998, 2005) hypotheses on the basis of Relevance Theory will be picked up, and the core function of *although* will be considered. It will discuss how and when each interpretation of *although* will be given, too. Both Mizono (2007) and Taoka (2006) exemplify each usage of *although*. Mizuno tries to show whether there are any differences between pre-posed and post-posed *although-clauses*. They do not discuss what is the core function of *although*, but the research helped me to find a problem with Iten (2005). I will modify the definition of *although* by Iten, based on the analyses given by Mizono (2007) and Taoka (2006).

In section 2, Iten (1998, 2005) will be reviewed. It will be shown that Iten's analyses has a problem with some post-posed *although-clauses*, since these behave like the coordinate conjunction *but*. Section 3 will provide more considerations to come up with an alternative hypothesis. It will be suggested that *although* guides us to find the contradiction between *although-clauses* and main clauses through inferences. The effect of canceling assumptions that arises from use of *but* is brought about by the property of post-posed adverbial clauses as well as 'End-focus.' This means that the most important information, mostly new information, in a clause or sentence is placed at the end. The concluding remarks will be given in section 4.

## 2. Previous Studies on *Although*

Most dictionaries contain little information on *although*. For example, *The Longman English Dictionary Online* defines it as follows:

1. used to introduce a statement that makes your main statement seem surprising or unlikely [= though]
2. used to add a statement that balances or reduces the effect of what you have just said [= but]:

For this research, the first definition will be divided into two groups. In the next subsection, the usages of *although* will be exemplified. In the subsection 2.2., Iten's (1998, 2005) analyses will be introduced.

### 2. 1. Three Usages of *Although*

Following the latest previous studies such as Mizuno (2007) and Taoka (2006), the usages of *although* can be classified roughly into three groups; concessives, adversatives, and rectifying concessives. The example (3a) shows a concessive case. The *although* in the example (3b) is adversative. Rectifying concessive cases are exemplified in (3c). The examples (3a) and (3b) are cited from *The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English Online*. The example (3c) comes from the CD-ROM dictionary *Eijiro* (2002). (The

bold letters for emphasis in the examples will be henceforth added by the author.)

- (3) a. We decided to take rooms in Longwood House, **although** we knew we could not really afford the rent.  
 b. **Although** I can't help admiring the man's courage, I do not approve of his methods.  
 c. I have nothing important to do today, **although** I do some housework.

The clarification of each usage is as follows: According to Iten (2005, p. 159), concessives are a special case of adversatives. Iten makes a slight modification to König's (1985) observation regarding properties of concessives and adversatives (Iten, p. 158). König thinks of *P but Q* as the prototypical means of expressing an 'adversative' relation and considers *Q although P/Although P, Q* as the prototypical 'concessive' expression (Iten p. 158). König alleges that *although* has the properties in (4) and *but* has the properties in (5).

- (4) *typical form*: although *P, Q*  
*entailments*: *P, Q*  
*(non-logical) implication*: Normally (if *P*, then not-*Q*) (p. 4)
- (5) *typical form*: *P but Q*  
*entailments*: *P, Q*  
*(non-logical) implications*:  $P \Rightarrow R, Q \Rightarrow \text{not-}R, Q$  carries more weight (p. 6)

However, Iten shows that *although* can do duty for adversative or indirect denial *but*, and that direct denial or concessive *but* can replace *although* (p. 161). On analysis, Iten redefines the type in (4) as concessives, which is characterized by direct denial, and the type in (5) as adversatives characterized by indirect denial.

Following the definitions by Iten, the examples (3a) and (3b) could be explained like this: The inference (if *P*, then not-*Q*) in (6) could be the implication of the example (3a). The segment *we knew we could not really afford the rent* may imply that *we did not decide to take rooms in Longwood House*, and the main clause *We decided to take rooms in Longwood House* directly denies this. The implications of the example (3b) can be the ones in (7). The segment *I can't help admiring the man's courage* may imply that *I admit the man is great*. The main clause *I do not approve of his methods* may have the implication that *I do not admit the man is great*. That is to say, the type of *although* in (3a) is direct denial, while the example (3b) shows indirect denial.

- (6) If we can not really afford the rent, we will not decide to take rooms in Longwood House.  
 (7) a. If I can't help admiring the man's courage, I admit the man is great.  
 b. If I do not approve of his methods, I do not admit the man is great.

There are other characteristics of concessive cases that some previous studies have indicated. Mizuno (2007), Higashimori (1992) and some other previous studies state that concessive cases must have a causal relation between P and not-Q. Besides, many previous studies mention that “Concessive conjunctions signal the unexpected, surprising nature of what is being said in view of what was said before (Quirk & Greenbaum, 1973, p. 292).”

Taoka (2006, p. 7) and Mizuno (2007, p. 10) observe that *although* in some cases has a function of weakening the main clauses unlike concessive and adversative *although-clauses* which emphasize the main clauses. Mizuno calls such a usage of *although* ‘rectifying concessives (p. 10).’ Some dictionaries recognise this usage, too. For instance, the *Macmillan English Dictionary* says, *although* is “used for introducing a statement that makes what you have just said seem less true or less likely.” Moreover, *Cobuild Student’s Dictionary* defines *although* as follows: “*although* is used to introduce clauses that modify what is being said or that add further information.” Here are some examples from the dictionaries. (Henceforth, squares will be added to the examples by the author in order to show clearly that the part is considered to be the speaker’s or writer’s claim.)

(8) a. She’s a very popular author, **although** personally I find her books rather boring.

b. The Lamberts liked their new home, **although** sometimes they missed their friends.

(*Macmillan English Dictionary*)

(9) Something about the man was familiar, **although** Hillsden could not immediately place him.

(*Cobuild Student’s Dictionary*)

Those dictionaries say that the *although* in the examples can be replaced with *but* or *however*.

Now go back to the example (3c). The statement *I have nothing important to do today* is weakened by the *although-clause*. In other words, it means that *there is some housework and then it is not perfectly true that there is nothing important to do*.

In this section, the usages of *although* have been classified under three groups and each has been given the specific definition for the sake of this research.

## 2. 2. Iten’s (1998, 2005) Analyses

Iten (1998, 2005) conducts a research in Relevance Theory as regard to what procedural information *although* has. The procedural information defined by Iten (1998) is as below:

What follows (i.e. P) contradicts, but does not eliminate, X. X is an aspect of the interpretation of Q.

(p. 20)

This is basically taken to mean that P leads to the conclusion  $\neg X$ , but that the evidence for X, or Q, is stronger than that for  $\neg X$  (pp. 20–21).

In Iten (2005), on the other hand, it is defined as in (6):

Suspend an inference from what follows (i.e. P) to a conclusion that would have to be eliminated.

(p. 186)

According to Iten (2005), *although* needs a contextual assumption that licenses an inference with an undesirable result from P as well as a candidate ‘eliminator’ assumption (p. 184).

- i. the assumption that would license the suspended inference; and
- ii. the assumption that would force the elimination of the inferred conclusion.

Iten (1998) and (2005) explain the ‘concessive’ (1) example (10) respectively as below:

(10) Peter went out **although** it was raining. (Iten, 1998, p. 22; 2005, p. 180)

Iten (1998) argues that the hearer will take *although* in (10) to instruct him that P contradicts but does not eliminate X, an aspect of the interpretation of Q; the most accessible aspect of the interpretation of Q will be Q (p. 21). In (10), a contextual assumption or implicated premise like (11a) will be derived. The truth-conditional content of (10) is given in (11b) and (11c). They will yield a contextual implication or an implicated conclusion like (11d).

- (11) a. In general, it follows from the fact that it is raining that Peter is not going out.
- b. Peter went out at  $t_1$ .
- c. It was raining at  $t_1$ .
- d. It is remarkable that Peter went out, given that it was raining.

Iten mentions that the interpretation of (11) should be like this: “there is a general rule that the rain keeps Peter from going out, but the particular time the speaker is talking about is an exception in that it was raining and Peter did go out at that time (pp. 21–22).”

Iten (2005) says, on the other hand, “the hearer first processes Q (Peter went out), then *although* indicates that there is an inference from P (it was raining) that has to be suspended because it would yield a conclusion that would have to be discarded (p. 180).” The contextual assumption in this example will be that people don’t go out if it rains. It licenses an inference from “IT WAS RAINING to PETERx (sic) DIDN’T GO OUT

(p. 180),” which would obviously contradict the basic explicature of Q (Peter went out). Iten hypothecates that the inferred conclusion would have to be eliminated because the speaker’s utterance of Q explicitly conveys the contradicted assumption. Iten does not think that *although* per se encodes elimination. In terms of the effort of interpretation in Relevance Theory, Iten alleges that “the use of *although* saves the hearer the effort of inferring the conclusion that would have to be discarded again immediately because it contradicts a more manifest assumption (p. 180).”

Iten assumes that the hearer can save processing effort by a signal for suspension which *although* gives. I conjecture that the reason Iten thinks in that way is that the inference in (12b) does not play an important role. Without it, the main clause could convey unexpected facts based on the assumption (12a). Therefore, the procedure that the inferred conclusion from P will be eliminated should be cut off by *although* to save the hearer the useless effort of the inference.

- (12) a. people don’t go out if it rains.  
 b. (Peter didn’t go out) if it was raining.  
 (10) Peter went out **although** it was raining.

Judging from (12a) and (10), the hearer or reader understands that Peter’s behavior is different from many people. That is a surprising or unexpected thing.

### 3. Considerations

It will be shown that both the old and new proposals by Iten have a problem, which is that Iten (1998) and (2005) cannot capture some cases of post-posed *although-clauses* that can be replaced with *but*. Thus, an alternative hypothesis should be provided. In my view, it is hypothesized that the interpretation of cancellation of expectations is caused by other factors, coupled with procedural information of *although*.

#### 3. 1. A Problem with Iten

Concessive and adversative usages of *although* seem to be beautifully explained by Iten (1998) and (2005). However, there are some counterexamples against Iten. Iten cannot capture rectifying concessive cases. Here is one example.

- (13) Mr. Loving and Ms. Shelltrack have lived together for 13 years, longer than many modern marriages. They consider themselves engaged, **although** they have set no date for a wedding. “We never really felt a huge need to do it. We’re a family, regardless,” Ms. Shelltrack says. (Miszno, 2008, pp.67–68)

According to Mizuno (2007, p. 68), “the propositional content of the main clause may evoke an assumption

that, if they consider themselves engaged, they have set the date for the wedding. However, this assumption is cancelled by *the although-clause they have set no date for a wedding.*” Based on the analysis, the part of the definition by Iten (1998), “does not eliminate X, an aspect of the interpretation of Q” seems to be wrong because X, *they will get married soon* in the example (14a) is deleted. Namely, it is not always true that “the evidence for X, or Q, is stronger than that for  $\neg X$  (pp. 20–21).” In Iten (2005), the part of the definition “from what follows (i.e. P) to a conclusion (p. 186)” is likely to be incorrect for the same reason. In the example (13), readers will make an inference from the main clause *They consider themselves engaged* first, and then the possible inferred conclusion *they will be get married soon* in (14a) is eliminated by the possible inferred conclusion from what follows *although, they will not get married soon* in (14b)

- (14) a. If they consider themselves engaged, they will get married soon.  
 b. If they have set no date for a wedding, they will not get married soon.

In Iten’s (2005) hypothesis, what follows *although* (i.e. P) is supposed to be a presupposition, but Taoka (2006) says that there are some other cases of post-posed *although-clauses* where the main clauses (i.e. Q) are more likely to be presuppositions (p.4). Here is one of such examples Taoka (2006) gives:

- (15) She realized that he looked more like her father than ever when he smiled, **although** her father hadn’t smiled very often. (Taoka, 2006, p.4)

Taoka (2006) mentions that the statement in the *although-clause* (i.e. P) is a comment on the event described in the main clause. Therefore, the main clause (i.e. Q) seems to be a presupposition in the inference shown in (16).

- (16) If she realized that he looked more like her father than ever when he smiled, her father must have smiled very often.

The possible inferred conclusion (i.e. X in 1998 and R in 2005), *her father must have smiled very often*, is eliminated by  $\neg X$ , an aspect of the interpretation of P (not-R in 2005); the most accessible aspect of the interpretation of P will be P, *her father hadn’t smiled very often.*

### 3. 2. A Solution and Verification

From the foregoing analysis, an alternative hypothesis will be provided as follows:

- I. In Q *although P/Although P, Q, although* guides us to find the contradiction between what follows it (i.e. P)



and the main clause (i.e. Q) through inferences.

- a. Concessives: Normally (if *P*, then not-*Q*)
- b. Adversatives:  $P \Rightarrow R, Q \Rightarrow \text{not-}R$ , *Q* carries more weight
- c. Rectifying concessives: *Q* is weakened by either *R* or not-*Q*.

II. *Although-clauses* function to add additional information to the main clauses.

In order to define the procedural information of *although* including rectifying concessives shown in the subsection 3.1., I have to say that it is not a good idea to assume that what follows (i.e. *P*) is a presupposition of the inference. It is because, according to the context, either what follows it (i.e. *P*) or the main clause (i.e. *Q*) can be a presupposition of the inference; hence, I modify the proposal by Iten (1998, 2005) and suggest that the procedural information is defined in (I). The interpretation of each usage is derived from the context and each usage is identified by how to make an inference. The low-order items (a) to (c) show how the inference is made in each context. It is assumed that the characteristic of *although* mentioned in (II) is derived from the property of subordinate conjunctions. This characteristic will also affect the interpretation. Take a look at the following example.

- (17) The family appeared wholesome, and moneyed certainly, **although** his mother's drinking increased steadily over time, and wound her up in an institution eventually, leaving Peter and his two full siblings technically orphaned. (D. Steel, Ransom, p. 3; Taoka, 2006, p. 5)

In Iten (2005), the assumption that would force the elimination of the inferred conclusion not-*R* ( $\neg X$  in 1998) is required, which is the main clause (i.e. *Q*) or *X*. In rectifying concessives, however, if it is *Q* or *R* (*X* in 1998), the contextual effect of weakening the main clauses (i.e. *Q*) will not be brought about because the assumption that would force the elimination of the inferred conclusion should be *P* or not-*R* ( $\neg X$  in 1998), and it is the main clauses that are partly denied.

The second item is related to the effect of weakening the main clauses in rectifying concessives, and emphasizing the main clauses in concessive and adversative *although-clauses*. Because *although-clauses* are subordinate, main clauses usually have more weight. In my definition, from the perspective of the function, it is paraphrased with the sentence that *although-clauses* function to add additional information to the main clause, as stated in Taoka's (2006, p. 5) analysis - "to add additional information to the main clause."

Many previous studies (e.g. Mizuno, 2007, p. 21; Taoka, 2006, p. 2) recognize that the main clauses are given more weight by concessive and adversative *although-clauses*. Especially, in concessive cases, the main clauses deliver the unexpected, surprising information and the position of *although-clauses* in the sentence does not make a difference in the interpretation because *although-clauses* are subordinate.

The following examples show that *although-clauses* convey additional information. The pronoun *it* in (18B)

and (18B) refers to the information in the squares respectively. To put it in another way, the person B in (18) means that *I cannot believe she failed*, while B in (19) means that *I cannot believe she did her best*. Therefore, the dialogue in (19) *sounds weird*.

(18) A: **Although** she did her best, she failed.

B: She is such a smart girl. I can't believe it!

(19) A: **Although** she failed, she did her best.

B: ? She is such a smart girl. I can't believe it!

In (18), P *she did her best* contradicts R (X in 1998), *she failed* given that normally, if P *she did her best* then not-R ( $\neg$ X in 1998) *she did not fail*. Thinking of the contextual assumption, it is clear that Q *she failed* is exceptional. The main clause Q contains exceptional information and carries more weight than P because the speaker tries to let us know Q more than P. <sup>(2)</sup> Therefore, the main clause is emphasized. not-R ( $\neg$ X in 1998) *she did not fail* is weaker than R (X in 1998) *she failed*.

In (19), the order of the clauses is reversed. P is that *she failed*, and Q is that *she did her best*. Iten (1998) argues that the 'if...then' is taken to express an epistemic connection, which gives rise to an implicature like (20).

(20) Normally, from P the speaker would conclude that not Q.

From this implicature, it can be said that Q *she did her best* is exceptional and emphasized. Owing to the emphasis on the main clause, R (X in 1998) *she did her best* is not eliminated because not-R ( $\neg$ X in 1998) *she did not her best* is weaker than that.

In rectifying concessives, the information in the post-posed *although-clauses* weaken the information in the main clauses. According to Taoka (2006, p.5), the *although-clauses* in those cases appear after the main clauses, but since *although-clauses* are subordinate, the inferred conclusion from what follows (i.e. P) cannot override the one from the main clause (i.e. Q). The following examples show that the information in the main clause is followed up and developed in subsequent sentences. There would be no big problem without the *although-clause* which carries additional information to the main clause.

(21) It's the right goal, we just need a financing strategy to get there. That doesn't mean just more money, **although** some more money will be needed. It also means better attention to effectiveness and to efficiency, and to making sure that spending goes to the places that will make a difference in educational attainment. We know how to do it, if we want to. (Wellman, Jane, September 12, 2010)

(22) Ann Campbell and Marla Schroeder dub each other "battle buddies." **although** they've never gone to

war. Between them, they have 45 years in the U.S. Army. They're the wives of the top commanders of the 101st Airborne Division. (Drash, Wayne., September 21, 2010)

In rectifying concessive cases, however, there are confusing cases where *although-clauses* behave like main clauses even if *although-clauses* are subordinate ones. That is why the term “subordinate” should be avoided in the definition. Taoka illustrates such a case with the following example (p. 5).

- (23) She was the prettier of the two, **although** they were almost identical and looked like twins. Both were blue-eyed blonds like their mother. (D. Steel, *Second Chance*, p. 115; Taoka, p. 5)

The main clause mentions that there is a difference between them, and *although-clause* says that they are similar to each other. The sentence following the *although-clause* gives examples of similarities between them.

Quirk et.al. (1985) also mentions that “in speech, a special kind of intonation is required for such a clause, normally a falling–rising nuclear tone (p. 642).” That segment in the square is considered to be what the speaker or writer wants to claim.

- (24) He is POOR| - **although** he is SATisfied (sic) with his condition.  
 = **Although** he is poor, he is satisfied with his condition.

The examples in (24) show us that the points to consider are the information in squares. According to Quirk et.al., “final *although-clause* can imply some claim of the speaker.”

- (25) He is poor - [I maintain that this is true] {**although**} he is satisfied with his condition.

In conversations, this usage of *although* might not be common as an informant indicates. *But* is more commonly used in such sentences. *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary* (2000) says that *although* can be replaced with *but*, which is formal. It is not difficult to find the usage of *although* in written articles.

- (26) All that remained at one of the destroyed log homes was a burned out chimney standing near an empty animal pen where the owners, desperate to flee in approaching fire, set two horses and a sheep free and hoped the animals could get themselves out of danger.

The fire had caused no major injuries, officials said, **although** two police officers were treated for smoke inhalation and a third for minor injuries after being hit by the vehicle of a driver trying to return home. the Deseret News reported. (Jeniffer Dobner, Monday, September 20, 2010)

- (27) The Tab (sic) carries the Google-certified logo, and has the Google Android Market on-board. Samsung says the 80,000-plus apps in the Android Market will work on the device, **although** only a small number of those are actually optimized for the Tab's roomy screen size and resolution. Apps that aren't optimized, according to Samsung, will appear centered in the screen at 800 by 400 resolution, which may help explain why I had the initial impression that unscaled apps looked better here on the Tab than unscaled apps on the iPad do. (Melissa J. Perenson, Monday, September 20, 2010)

As some dictionaries and literature say, the information is focused more on *although-clauses* in the squares than on the clauses prior to them. In the news shown in (26), people want to know whether there are any injured people in accidents and detailed information about it carries more weight. After the sentence including *although* in the example (27), you can see that the topic is about applications which are not optimized. The sentence will sound a little off when the *although-clause* is fronted.

However, Taoka (2006, pp. 2–3) also indicates that *although-clauses* in rectifying concessives do not convey the main idea that the author really wants to convey. After the *although-clause*, the *but-clause* follows. The *but-clause* denies the content in the *although-clause*. The segments following the *but-clause* have an association with the main clause of *although*.

- (28) She didn't really have room for him, **although** he was happy staying with her, **but** her closets were nightmare, and she couldn't seem to find space for him.  
(D. Steel, Second Chance p. 107; Taoka, pp. 2–3)

If *although-clauses* supplement the main clauses because they are subordinate, why can final *although-clauses* imply some claim of the speaker as Taoka (2006) and Quirk et.al. (1985) indicate above? Mizuno (2007, p. 135), following the previous studies of Langacker (1991), Haiman and Thompson (1984), and Cristofaro (2003), concludes that “pre-posed adverbial clauses tend to be more subordinate-like, while post-posed adverbial clauses tend to be more coordinate-like.” Making reference to G. Lakoff's (1984) observation that “‘Main Clause Phenomena’ (MCP) like inversion occur in post-posed, but not pre-posed (Mizuno, 2007, p. 135),” Mizuno takes up the following examples to show that post-posed *although-clauses* obtain a coordinate-like status.

- (29) More than likely, this panic will be used as a way to cut costs and ditch staff. Karren Brady is already taking of getting rid of players at At. Andrews, **although** wouldn't it similar changes need to be made if Birmingham failed once again to reach the Premiership?
- (30) James Earl Jones is one of the biggest performers in the American theater today. It's not just his physical size that is imposing, **although** how can you overlook the hulking torso, the rotund basso's

chest, the broad expanse of the dace or massive hands, better described, really, as mitts?

Giving the following examples, Mizuno shows that preposing the *although-clauses* in these examples results in infelicitous sentences (p. 157).

- (31) \***Although** wouldn't it similar changes need to be made if Birmingham failed once again to reach the Premiership, Karren Brady is already taking of getting rid of players at At. Andrews.
- (32) \***Although** how can you overlook the hulking torso, the rotund basso's chest, the broad expanse of the dace or massive hands, better described, really, as mitts, it's not just his physical size that is imposing.

Mizuno concludes that "pre-posed *although-clauses* are consistently presented as background, whereas post-posed versions can be presented as background or as foreground. (p.177) " Note that this is thought to be due to the property of subordinate clauses. Therefore, this holds true of other adverbial clauses. Consulting previous works, Mizuno (2007) suggests that the adverbial clauses show a tendency as follows:

- (33) pre-posed adverbial clauses tend to be more subordinate-like, while post-posed adverbial clauses tend to be more coordinate-like.

I define the function of *although* in (II) as supplementing the main clause. Supplemented information in subordinate clauses can be as important as information in main clauses in certain contexts. Remember that post-posed *although-clauses* can be more coordinate-like because of the property of subordinate clauses. According to Mizuno's (2007, p. 121) investigation, moreover, there is no single instance representing discourse-old information in 89 post-posed *although-clauses*. It can be concluded from this that another factor is that "the proper place for the word, or group of words, which the writer desires to make most prominent is usually the end of the sentence. The word or group of words entitled to this position of prominence is usually the logical predicate, that is, the new element in the sentence (Strunk, Jr., 1918)." Due to this "End Focus," post-posed additional information appears to be the main point.

In this section, I pointed out a problem with Iten's (1998, 2005) analyses concerning *although*. Iten cannot capture 'rectifying concessives, where *although-clauses* weaken the main clauses (Mizuno, 2007; Taoka, 2006).' I made an alternative hypothesis and the need to modify Iten's hypotheses is described.

#### 4. Conclusion

In this section, I will sum up this paper. For this research, in section 1, the usages of *although* were divided into three groups on the basis of previous studies: concessives, adversatives, and rectifying concessives. The term 'rectifying concessives' refers to cases where the main clauses are weakened unlike concessive

and adversative *although-clauses* emphasize the main clauses. Mizuno (2007), Taoka (2006) and some dictionaries recognized the usage. In section 2, I reviewed Iten (1998) and Iten (2005) and it was also indicated that Iten failed to capture rectifying concessive cases. In section 3, a modified proposal was made and the need for modification of Iten's hypotheses was verified. It was argued that procedural information of *although* does not contain specific information on the effects of the main clauses' being emphasized or weakened by *although-clauses*. It was shown the possibility that those effects are brought about due to other factors such as a property of adverbial clauses and 'End Focus.'

#### Notes

- (1) Here are some definitions. Quirk et.al. claims that "concessive clauses indicate that the situation in the matrix clause is contrary to expectation in the light of what is said in the concessive clause (p.1098)." In *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary* (2005), you will find the definition that concessive means "the action of the main clause is in fact true or possible, despite the situation."
- (2) The Write Site also says, "Generally, the information, evidence or argument you wish to endorse is positioned in the part of the sentence that does not contain the concessive clause." It is said that concessive-clauses serve to concede a certain part of an argument before proceeding to question the validity of the point in a given discussion. Likewise, *Macmillan English Dictionary* states that *although* is "used for introducing a statement that makes your main statement seem surprising."

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