{"created":"2023-07-27T04:43:10.392976+00:00","id":41679,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"a88d1102-dbfb-408a-814c-98cb4ad6f970"},"_deposit":{"created_by":3,"id":"41679","owners":[3],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"41679"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:tohoku.repo.nii.ac.jp:00041679","sets":["81:225"]},"author_link":["93921"],"item_4_biblio_info_6":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2005-03","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicIssueNumber":"1","bibliographicPageEnd":"58","bibliographicPageStart":"49","bibliographicVolumeNumber":"11","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Interdisciplinary information sciences"}]}]},"item_4_date_62":{"attribute_name":"登録日","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_date_issued_datetime":"2007-06-25","subitem_date_issued_type":"Created"}]},"item_4_date_63":{"attribute_name":"公開日（投稿完了日）","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_date_issued_datetime":"2007-06-25","subitem_date_issued_type":"Created"}]},"item_4_date_65":{"attribute_name":"発行日","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_date_issued_datetime":"2005-03","subitem_date_issued_type":"Created"}]},"item_4_date_80":{"attribute_name":"更新日","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_date_issued_datetime":"2010-01-27","subitem_date_issued_type":"Created"}]},"item_4_description_15":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_4_description_4":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"This paper presents an examination of a lobbying game between a government with informational superiority and a special interest group (SIG), which is a lobbyist. This informational superiority of the government allows the application of an analytical method of ordinary contract theory in this game. Results of these analyses show that, for a SIG whose population is sufficiently small, although the government has informational superiority to the SIG, the government is unable to prevent the SIG from distorting policy excessively by endowing a political contribution to the government. However, for a SIG whose population is sufficiently large, the government's informational superiority can stanch the SIG inducement of a larger policy by endowing a political contribution to the government. In this case, government disclosure is not always socially desirable.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_4_description_41":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"紀要類(bulletin)","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_4_description_66":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"146838 bytes","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_4_publisher_34":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"Graduate School of Information Sciences, Tohoku University"}]},"item_4_radio_69":{"attribute_name":"公開範囲","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_radio_item":"学外"}]},"item_4_source_id_7":{"attribute_name":"ISSN","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"1340-9050","subitem_source_identifier_type":"ISSN"}]},"item_4_source_id_9":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA11032627","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Kanzaki, Masayuki"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"93921","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2017-02-15"}],"displaytype":"detail","filename":"11_49.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"146.8 kB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_note","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"11_49.pdf","url":"https://tohoku.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/41679/files/11_49.pdf"},"version_id":"4ec192fe-8025-486c-a039-8dbff7cc6a2c"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"departmental bulletin paper","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]},"item_title":"Lobbying Game between the Government with Private Information and the Lobbyist (Special Section for the GSIS Workshop on Game Theoretic Analyses of Social Institutions)","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Lobbying Game between the Government with Private Information and the Lobbyist (Special Section for the GSIS Workshop on Game Theoretic Analyses of Social Institutions)"}]},"item_type_id":"4","owner":"3","path":["225"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2007-06-25"},"publish_date":"2007-06-25","publish_status":"0","recid":"41679","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Lobbying Game between the Government with Private Information and the Lobbyist (Special Section for the GSIS Workshop on Game Theoretic Analyses of Social Institutions)"],"weko_creator_id":"3","weko_shared_id":3},"updated":"2023-07-28T00:02:17.671792+00:00"}