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Lobbying Game between the Government with Private Information and the Lobbyist (Special Section for the GSIS Workshop on Game Theoretic Analyses of Social Institutions)
http://hdl.handle.net/10097/17398
http://hdl.handle.net/10097/17398cca7cf0d-d687-4dd9-8973-1edc89b2157b
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
11_49.pdf (146.8 kB)
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| Item type | 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2007-06-25 | |||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||
| タイトル | Lobbying Game between the Government with Private Information and the Lobbyist (Special Section for the GSIS Workshop on Game Theoretic Analyses of Social Institutions) | |||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||||
| 資源タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||||
| 著者 |
Kanzaki, Masayuki
× Kanzaki, Masayuki
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| 抄録 | ||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||||
| 内容記述 | This paper presents an examination of a lobbying game between a government with informational superiority and a special interest group (SIG), which is a lobbyist. This informational superiority of the government allows the application of an analytical method of ordinary contract theory in this game. Results of these analyses show that, for a SIG whose population is sufficiently small, although the government has informational superiority to the SIG, the government is unable to prevent the SIG from distorting policy excessively by endowing a political contribution to the government. However, for a SIG whose population is sufficiently large, the government's informational superiority can stanch the SIG inducement of a larger policy by endowing a political contribution to the government. In this case, government disclosure is not always socially desirable. | |||||||
| 書誌情報 |
Interdisciplinary information sciences 巻 11, 号 1, p. 49-58, 発行日 2005-03 |
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| ISSN | ||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||||
| 収録物識別子 | 1340-9050 | |||||||
| 書誌レコードID | ||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA11032627 | |||||||
| フォーマット | ||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||
| 内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||||
| 出版者 | ||||||||
| 出版者 | Graduate School of Information Sciences, Tohoku University | |||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||
| 内容記述 | 紀要類(bulletin) | |||||||
| 登録日 | ||||||||
| 日付 | 2007-06-25 | |||||||
| 日付タイプ | Created | |||||||
| 公開日（投稿完了日） | ||||||||
| 日付 | 2007-06-25 | |||||||
| 日付タイプ | Created | |||||||
| 発行日 | ||||||||
| 日付 | 2005-03 | |||||||
| 日付タイプ | Created | |||||||
| フォーマット | ||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||
| 内容記述 | 146838 bytes | |||||||
| 更新日 | ||||||||
| 日付 | 2010-01-27 | |||||||
| 日付タイプ | Created | |||||||
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Cite as
Kanzaki, Masayuki, 2005, Lobbying Game between the Government with Private Information and the Lobbyist (Special Section for the GSIS Workshop on Game Theoretic Analyses of Social Institutions): Graduate School of Information Sciences, Tohoku University, 49–58 p.
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