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  1. 310 情報科学研究科
  2. Interdisciplinary information sciences

Model Analysis of Communication Scheme in Participatory Planning Game as an Institutionalized Conflict (Special Section for the GSIS Workshop on Game Theoretic Analyses of Social Institutions)

http://hdl.handle.net/10097/17212
http://hdl.handle.net/10097/17212
174b784c-02d3-4f7f-bc34-48a6d5facc11
名前 / ファイル ライセンス アクション
11_69.pdf 11_69.pdf (204.0 kB)
Item type 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1)
公開日 2007-06-25
タイトル
タイトル Model Analysis of Communication Scheme in Participatory Planning Game as an Institutionalized Conflict (Special Section for the GSIS Workshop on Game Theoretic Analyses of Social Institutions)
言語
言語 eng
資源タイプ
資源タイプ識別子 http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
資源タイプ departmental bulletin paper
著者 Sakakibara, Hiroyuki

× Sakakibara, Hiroyuki

Sakakibara, Hiroyuki

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抄録
内容記述タイプ Abstract
内容記述 In infrastructure planning, more and more citizens are participating in decision making process. Such process is often called “participatory planning." This paper focuses on the aspect of participatory planning as an “institutionalized" conflict. In an institutionalized conflict, only a few players can take actions. Other citizens can observe a development of the conflict, but they can affect the process only indirectly. Players try to behave according to the preferences of their “supporters." In such a conflict, players need to communicate with supporters to know their preferences. However, players and supporters cannot necessarily share the knowledge about interaction of players' behaviors (strategies), and they tend to use more simplified mechanisms. Under such simplified mechanisms, players may take different behavior principles, and a final outcome of a conflict can be changed.In this paper, an institutionalized conflict in participatory planning is assumed, and an appropriate opinion-summarizing mechanism between players and supporters is examined. First, the conflict in participatory planning is modeled as non-cooperative game. Then, the relationship between an opinion-summarizing mechanism and an outcome of the conflict is analyzed, and the mechanism based on preference on actions may lead to an inefficient outcome. It is also shown that the effect of opinion-summarizing mechanisms depends on the structure of a conflict.
書誌情報 Interdisciplinary information sciences

巻 11, 号 1, p. 69-79, 発行日 2005-03
ISSN
収録物識別子タイプ ISSN
収録物識別子 1340-9050
書誌レコードID
収録物識別子タイプ NCID
収録物識別子 AA11032627
フォーマット
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 application/pdf
出版者
出版者 Graduate School of Information Sciences, Tohoku University
資源タイプ
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 紀要類(bulletin)
登録日
日付 2007-06-25
日付タイプ Created
公開日(投稿完了日)
日付 2007-06-25
日付タイプ Created
発行日
日付 2005-03
日付タイプ Created
フォーマット
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 203978 bytes
更新日
日付 2010-01-27
日付タイプ Created
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